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ONTOLOGICAL DEFLATIONISM: PLURAL QUANTIFICATION, 
MEREOLOGICAL COLLECTIONS, AND QUANTIFIER VARIANCE 
 
 
 One criticism by deflationists about ontology is that ontological debates about 
composite material objects are merely verbal. That is, there is only apparent disagreement 
between the debating ontologists. In responding to such a deflationist view, Theodore 
Sider (2009) has argued that there is genuine disagreement between two ontologists 
concerning the ontological status of tables. In doing so, Sider has written that, using 
plural quantification, a mereological nihilist can grant the proposition ‘There exist 
simples arranged tablewise’ while denying the proposition ‘There exist collections of 
simples arranged tablewise’. In the first chapter, I a gue that Sider’s response to the 
deflationist is unsuccessful for two reasons. The first is that plural quantification is not 
ontologically innocent. A semantic interpretation of a logical formula involving plural 
quantification will reveal a problematic locution, namely, ‘one of them’ where ‘them’ has 
a collection as its referent. The second concern with Sider’s response is that the predicate 
‘arranged tablewise’ is collective rather than distributive. A collection is needed to 
instantiate a collective predicate; thus, a commitment to simples arranged tablewise 
entails a commitment to a collection of simples arranged tablewise.  
 
  iii  
 
 In responding to the ontological deflationist, Sider iscusses a debate between 
David Lewis and Peter van Inwagen about the existence of tables where a table is 
interpreted as a collection of simples arranged tablewise. As part of his discussion, Sider 
claims that Lewis and van Inwagen agree on what counts as a table. Sider allows that the 
deflationist may have three candidate interpretations f r what counts as a ‘table’, but 
none will support the deflationist conclusion. In the second chapter, I address each 
candidate interpretation: (1) using Composition as Identity - a table is simples arranged 
tablewise, (2) a table is a set-theoretic collection of simples arranged tablewise, and (3) 
using Unrestricted Composition - a table is a mereological collection of simples arranged 
tablewise. I argue against Lewis’s argument for Comp sition as Identity and defend an 
argument by Sider in support of Unrestricted Composition. Thus, I argue that 
composition is unrestricted and not ontologically innocent. In doing so, I show that van 
Inwagen cannot grant 'There exist simples arranged tablewise' and deny the existence of 
tables. Thus, I show that, independent of plural quntification concerns, Sider is not 
successful in refuting the deflationist conclusion that the ontologists are equivocating on 
the word 'table'. 
 Finally, in the third chapter, I address Sider's re ponse to the deflationist claims 
that the ontologists are equivocating on the quantifier 'there exists'. I look at Sider's 
presentation of the argument and his response which centers on an appeal to naturalness. 
Relying on Eli Hirsch's defense of quantifier variance, I show that the deflationist 
position can be maintained if Sider's appeal to naturalness is rejected. Additionally, I 
argue that Sider's constructed ideal language, Ontologese, does not allow Sider to avoid 
the deflationist criticisms. I also address the question of whether or not the deflationist 
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program applies not only to ontological debates, but also to meta-ontological debates. To 
that end, I evaluate Gerald Marsh's (2010) meta-meta-on ological discussion in which he 
defends a dilemma for the Hirsch-Sider debate. I argue that Marsh's defense of the 
dilemma is problematic, and highlight a wider concer  I have about meta-meta-
ontological debates. I suggest that there is a frame of reference problem and end with the 
skeptical conclusion that answers at the meta-meta-ontological level are dependent on the 
language used to frame the debate. 
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CHAPTER ONE: ONTOLOGICAL INNOCENCE OF PLURAL QUANTIFICATION
 
I.I – Ontological Debate about Composite Material Objects 
 Theodore Sider has recently published an article def nding ontological realism 
against the deflationary claim that ontological debat s are not substantive (Sider 2009). In 
this chapter, I will critically evaluate one of the arguments that Sider uses in responding 
to what I call the deflationist argument from equivocation. In doing so, I will evaluate the 
ontological commitments of plural quantification and collective predication. To begin, I 
will briefly present the motivation for the deflationist position. 
 Deflationary concerns seem to result from the very nature of many ontological 
debates. One category of deflationist concerns stems from the view that certain 
ontological debates are trivial or shallow. Eli Hirsch, while defending his position he 
calls “ontological shallowness,” writes: 
Look at your hand while you are clenching it, and ask yourself whether some 
object called a fist has come into existence. As shallow ontologists the first 
thought that must come to mind when we ask this quetion is this: There can’t be 
anything deep or theoretical here. (Hirsch 2002, 67; Hirsch’s italics) 
For Hirsch, debates concerning the existence of a fist re not substantive, and the 
questions seem to have an obvious answer. In explicating the view that ontological 
debates are not substantive, Hirsch argues that “many familiar questions about the 
ontology of physical objects are merely verbal. Nothing is substantively at stake in these 




 In contrast to the deflationist, Sider considers the ontological debate about 
physical objects to be deep and significant. To address deflationist concerns, Sider 
chooses to evaluate an ontological debate concerning composite material objects. One 
might call Sider an “ontological realist” in the sens  that he thinks this and other 
ontological debates are substantive, and that “…the contemporary ontologists are 
approaching these questions in essentially the right way” (Sider 2009, 386). For Sider, the 
ontologists debating about composite material objects are trying to get at relevant facts 
about the world, and the answer to the debate is relevant and meaningful.  
 Before looking at the specific debate that Sider has in mind, I want to introduce 
my labels for the debating ontologists. For the twoopposing views on the ontological 
status of composites, I will adopt the labels used by Peter van Inwagen and David 
Chalmers in their discussions on the matter: nihilism and universalism.1 My usage is 
succinctly characterized by Chalmers as follows: “Given two distinct entities, when does 
a mereological sum of those entities exist? The universalist says always, while the nihilist 
says never” (Chalmers 2009, 77). Sider on the other hand, labels the debating ontologists 
with the initials of David Lewis (DL) for the universalist, and the initials of Peter van 
Inwagen (PVI) for the nihilist.2  
For a paradigmatic case of an ontological debate about composite material 
objects, Sider focuses on the debate between two ontologists concerning the ontological 
status of a table. The debate is centered on the question: Do tables exist if there are some 
                                                 
1 Chalmers (2009), van Inwagen (1990) 
 
2 My nihilist represents a stronger position than Sider’s PVI. van Inwagen grants composites if the 
composite forms a living thing, but denies composites otherwise. Sider recognizes this and in a footnote 
writes, “Let us imagine that, unlike Peter van Inwagen, PVI rejects the existence of composite living 
things” (Sider 2009, 389: fn. 17). Thus, to simplify matters, I am adopting more generic labels rather than 




particles arranged tablewise? The nihilist says no and the universalist says yes. That is, if 
there are some particles arranged tablewise, the nihilist will claim that a table does not 
exist while the universalist will claim that a table does exist. The deflationist will say that 
the debate is not meaningful or substantive. For example, Hirsch would say this debate is 
merely verbal. Sider presents the deflationist position as follows: “when some particles 
are arranged tablewise, there is no ‘substantive’ qu stion of whether there also exists a 
table composed of those particles… There are simply different—and equally good—ways 
to talk” (Sider 2009, 386).  
Now if the debate is trivial, then the deflationist must give reasons why these 
ontologists are so confused. The deflationist must provide cogent argumentation for the 
view that the ontological debate about composite material objects is not substantive. To 
that end, Sider argues that the deflationist only has two options for claiming that the 
debate is not substantive: “they [ontologists] must mean something different by the 
predicate ‘table’ or by the quantifier ‘there exist’ (or by both)” (Sider 2009, 387).  
If the debate is the result of different interpretations of the word ‘table’, then the 
ontologists are talking past one another and the debate is merely verbal. If the debate is 
trivial because of the existential quantifier, then the deflationist position involves 
“quantifier variance” which is a deflationist thesis that Sider also addresses in his article. 
However, to defend his position, Sider must refute both deflationist arguments. In this 
paper, I want to address some concerns I have regardin  Sider’s response to the 
deflationist claim that the ontological debate is merely verbal because the ontologists are 
equivocating on the meaning of ‘table’. That is, I will address Sider’s response to what I 




I.II – Sider on Predicate Equivocation 
Before evaluating Sider’s response, I want to look cl sely at Sider’s presentation 
of the deflationist argument from equivocation. To begin, Sider writes: 
PVI [nihilist] denies the sentence ‘There exist tables’ while admitting that there do 
exist simples arranged tablewise (Sider 2009, 388).  
Here Sider is presenting the nihilist position. The nihilist will grant the proposition ‘There 
exist simples arranged tablewise’ and deny the proposition ‘There exist tables’. Next 
Sider provides the definition of ‘table’ that is seemingly in use: 
But ‘table’ just means a collection of simples arranged tablewise. That’s what I 
mean by ‘table’, anyway; and presumably that’s what DKL [universalist] means 
by it as well (Sider 2009, 388). 
 Sider is presenting the definition of ‘table’ that both the nihilist (Sider’s PVI) and 
the universalist (Sider’s DKL) are presumably using. That is, the noun ‘table’ has by 
definition the same meaning as the noun phrase ‘collection of simples arranged 
tablewise’. Sider continues: 
Given this meaning of ‘table’, it is true by definit on that if there exist simples 
arranged tablewise then ‘There exists tables’ is true (Sider 2009, 388). 
The idea is that if one accepts this definition of table, then one cannot consistently grant 
the proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewis ’ and deny the proposition ‘There 
exist tables’. That is, given that a table is defind as a collection of simples arranged 
tablewise, then a commitment to the proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’ 
entails a commitment to the proposition ‘There exist tables’. 
However, the nihilist denies the proposition ‘There xist tables’ while granting the 
proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’.  For the deflationist, this is logically 




word ‘table’. Thus, the deflationist concludes that the ontologists are equivocating on the 
meaning of the word ‘table’. Sider provides the deflationist conclusion as follows: 
So PVI’s rejection of ‘There exist tables’ must be due to his meaning something 
different by ‘table’ (Sider 2009, 388) 
Let me offer an interpretation of the deflationist argument from equivocation that 
I hope will make this argument more perspicuous. I will start by defining three 
propositions (P1, P2, and P3)  and one definition (D1): 
P1: There exist tables. 
P2: There exist simples arranged tablewise. 
P3: There exist collections of simples arranged tablewise. 
D1: x is a table =df  x is a ‘collection’ of simples arranged tablewise (Sider 
2009, 388) 
Given these propositions and definition, the deflationist begins by claiming that a 
commitment to P3 and D1 entails a commitment to P1. Since the nihilist rejects P1, the 
deflationist concludes that the ontologists must diagree on the definition of ‘table’. This 
is the deflationist argument from equivocation. The deflationist argues that the nihilist 
and universalist are employing different meanings of the word ‘table’; hence, the debate 
about the ontological status of a table is trivial because the debate rests on an 
equivocation. 
The deflationist argument from equivocation turns o the claim that the 
ontologists disagree on the definition of ‘table’. Sider’s response is that the ontologists 
accept the definition, but disagree on whether something meets the definition. That is, the 
nihilist is not committed to the existence of a table ecause the nihilist will not grant P3. 




defined as a collection of simples arranged tablewis , but they disagree on whether there 
exists a collection of simples arranged tablewise. Sider argues that the universalist will 
grant the existence of a collection of simples arranged tablewise, but the nihilist will not. 
The nihilist will only grant the existence of simples arranged tablewise. That is, the 
nihilist will grant the proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’, and deny the 
proposition ‘There exist collections of simples arranged tablewise.’ Thus, for Sider, the 
debate is genuine and centers on the existence of a collection of simples arranged 
tablewise. Sider writes, “They [ontologists] agree on the condition ϕ that a thing must 
meet in order to count as a table; their disagreement is over whether there exists anything 
that meets that condition” (Sider 2009, 388). 
 Sider argues that, for the existence of a table to foll w logically from the 
definition, one must also accept the existence of a collection of simples arranged 
tablewise. However, the deflationist could respond to Sider by arguing that the meaning 
of ‘collection’ is such that the nihilist cannot deny their existence while admitting simples 
arranged tablewise. That is, given a certain understanding of ‘collection’, the deflationist 
will view a commitment to simples arranged tablewise a  requiring a commitment to a 
collection. If that is the case, and the ontologists agree on the definition, then the 
deflationist could argue that the proposition ‘There xist simples arranged tablewise’ is 
synonymous with the proposition ‘There exist tables’. Sider anticipates this retort and 




I.III – Nihilist's Use of Plural Quantification 
Sider briefly addresses the notion of ‘collection’ the ontologists have in mind so 
that he can show the debate is about the existence of a collection rather than the result of 
equivocating on the meaning of the word ‘collection’ in the definition of ‘table’. To do 
this, Sider begins by claiming that the notion of ‘collection’ used in the ontological 
debate only has two plausible meanings: mereological and set-theoretic. If neither 
meaning of ‘collection’ in the definition of ‘table’ secures synonymy between the 
propositions ‘There exist tables’ and ‘There exist s mples arranged tablewise’, then the 
deflationist argument from equivocation fails. Further, Sider argues that the word 
‘collection’ cannot simply be dropped from the definition because “in that case the 
definition is ungrammatical: ‘x is a table iff x is simples arranged tablewise’ (Sider 2009, 
389). Hence, ‘collection’ cannot be eliminated, and its meaning must be either 
mereological or set-theoretic. 
Sider dismisses the set-theoretic notion, claiming that the universalist does not 
have a set-theoretic notion in mind. Sider writes the following: 
…it’s clear that DKL does not mean by ‘table’: set-theoretic collection of simples 
arranged tablewise… When DKL says that there are tabl s, he is clear that he 
means: there are things whose parts are simples arranged tablewise. (Sider 2009, 
389) 
For Sider, this leaves only a mereological interpretation. I should note that Sider’s 
interpretation of a mereological collection is not one of unrestricted composition.3 For 
Sider, a mereological collection is one in which the whole and parts share a particular 
property. Sider writes the following: 
                                                 
3 I have in mind David Lewis’s understanding of unrest icted composition, “whenever there are some 
things, no matter how many or how unrelated or how disparate in character they may be, they have a 




…the interpretation of ‘collection’ under which DKL’s ‘table’ is plausibly taken 
as meaning ‘collection of simples arranged tablewis’… is mereological: a 
‘collection’ of things that ϕ is a thing whose parts ϕ. (Sider 2009, 388) 
With the meaning of ‘collection’ understood as mereological, Sider provides 
argumentation to explain how the nihilist can grant the proposition ‘There exist simples 
arranged tablewise’, and yet deny the existence of collections. Sider indicates how he 
thinks the nihilist can do this in the following: 
To be sure, he [nihilist] admits simples arranged tablewise (here I quantify 
plurally), but he rejects the existence of (mereological) collections of them (Sider 
2009, 388: brackets mine). 
This brief assertion is all Sider provides to defend his position. That is, a position 
where a nihilist can, using plural quantification, grant the existence of simples arranged 
tablewise and not be committed to the existence of a collection of simples arranged 
tablewise. I am highlighting Sider’s use of plural quantification because I think such a 
notion warrants more than a quick parenthetical remark. My concern is that, using plural 
quantification, the nihilist will  be committed to something more than simples arranged 
tablewise. Exactly what that commitment entails is what I want to discuss. 
In short, the nihilist uses plural quantification as a way to quantify over the 
existence of simples arranged tablewise without being committed to anything over and 
above the simples. This claim tacitly assumes that plural quantification is ontologically 
innocent. In this case, to be ontologically innocent means to be able to quantify over 
simples in a tablewise arrangement without being committed to something more than one 
is already committed to. Sider is claiming that using ontologically innocent plural 
quantification, the nihilist can grant ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’ without 
being committed to a collection. The question that Sider needs to address is: Is plural 




innocent, then this is a problem for Sider’s response. I turn now to an analysis of plural 
quantification and its ontological commitment. 
I.IV – Ontologically Innocent Plural Quantification  
Plural quantification is a topic associated with second-order logic; thus, to address 
plural quantification I need to briefly discuss second-order logic. This is best done by 
comparing second-order logic to the more common first-o der logic. Consider the 
following example: 
(1) Some rebels are scientists. 
A first-order interpretation of (1) would be: 
(1′) 	∃(	&	) 
(1′) can be read as: There exists an x such that x is a rebel and x is a scientist. Here the 
scope of the existential quantifier (∃x) is the well-formed formula (	&	). If I restrict 
the universe of discourse to all people, then x is a variable that ranges over all people. In a 
first-order system, x will take as a value some individual person. When instantiated, (1′) 
predicates ‘rebel’ and ‘scientist’ onto some individual person. Hence, a first-order 
quantifier is so called because it can only quantify over individuals rather than, for 
example, properties of individuals. Accordingly, a re ding of the first-order existential 
quantifier is ‘There exists an individual x such that…’. 
In first-order logic the noun ‘individual’ is commonly dropped from the noun 
phrase ‘an individual’ leaving only the indefinite article. Thus, the first-order existential 




one needs to quantify over something other than an i dividual thing. A widely used 
example of a sentence that requires quantifying over something other than an individual 
is the Geach-Kaplan sentence: 
(GK)  Some critics admire only one another.4 
(GK) seems to require quantification over at least a pair of critics. This pair of critics or 
plurality of individuals needs to be accounted for when symbolizing (GK). Moreover, an 
appropriate symbolization of (GK) should capture two important relational properties. 
The critics being talked about are such that they do not admire themselves, but rather 
admire one another. Secondly, these critics admire only one another; thus, do not admire 
any critic that is not one of them. 
There have been two general approaches to translating the Geach-Kaplan sentence 
into a formal system. The traditional view, associated with Quine, is to paraphrase the 
sentence into first-order logic with the introduction of sets or classes.5 An alternative 
view is offered by George Boolos in which plural quantification allows symbolizing 
(GK) without introducing sets.6 I will evaluate Quine’s account first, since Boolos’s 
account can be viewed as a response to Quine.  
Quine offered a simple solution to translating the Geach-Kaplan sentence. What 
seems like a requirement to quantify over something more than an individual can be 
remedied by forming an individual set of the plurality and using a first-order quantifier to 
                                                 
4 See Quine (1972, p.238) and (1973, p. 111) 
 
5 See Quine (1972) 
 




quantify over the individual set. Hence, Quine’s dictum that higher-order logic is, “set 
theory in sheep’s clothing” (Quine 1986, 66) 
Quine used the Geach-Kaplan sentence to demonstrate the utility of his system of 
first-order logic with the introduction of classes. Quine invokes classes or set theory as a 
way of analyzing the Geach-Kaplan sentence in terms of a first-order system. Quine 
writes: 
A new example of the power gained by quantifying over classes has been 
proposed by Geach and… Kaplan has proved that we cannot express this using 
just identity and the terms ‘critics’ and ‘admire’ and truth functions and 
quantification over persons (Quine 1972, 238).  
Quine is admitting that the Geach-Kaplan sentence cannot be rendered first-order without 
the addition of set theory. Accordingly, Quine transl tes (GK) using an existential 
quantifier that remains first-order by quantifying over sets. Quine’s symbolization of 
(GK) is as follows: 
(2) (∃	)((∃)( ∈ 	). () ∈ 	.⊃. 				. ()(			 ⊃.  ≠ .  ∈ 	))) 
(Quine 1972, 239) 
(2) is a symbolization using Quine’s notation. Quine uses Greek letters as class variables 
and ‘∈’ for the dyadic set-theoretic predicate ‘is a membr of’. Further, Quine uses dot 
notation like that of Principia Mathematica.7 The following is an interpretation of (2) into 
a more modern system: 
(3) (∃	)((∃)( ∈ 	)&()((( ∈ 	) → )&(()() → (( ≠ )&( ∈ 	)	)	)	)	) 
In (3), ‘Cx’ stands for ‘x is a critic’ and ‘Axy’ is the relational predicate ‘x admires y’. A 
reading of (3) is: There exists a set α such that, there is an x that is a member of α, and for 
                                                 




all x, if x is a member of α then x is a critic and for all y, x admires y only if x is not y and 
y is a member of α. Notice that no second-order variable is used; (3) quantifies over an 
individual set. 
 Quine has taken the Geach-Kaplan sentence as requiring the introduction of sets 
and Quine considers a sentence like (3) to be the most precise translation. For Quine, a 
second-order sentence is nothing more than a first-order sentence with quantification over 
sets. This seemingly innocuous assertion has ontological implications. The contentious 
issue is that we should not symbolize a sentence in such a way that in doing so we add to 
our ontology. The prevailing intuition is captured by Stewart Shapiro when he offers the 
following interpretation of Quine’s symbolization of the (GK): 
‘there is a nonempty set (or property) C (of critics) such that for any x in C and 
any y, if x admires y, then x≠y and y is in C.’ However, this reading implies the 
existence of a set (or property), while the original sentence, ‘Some critics admire 
only one another,’ does not… (Shapiro 2005, 763) 
It seems, as Shapiro notes, that the original sentence does not entail a set-theoretic 
interpretation. Although the Geach-Kaplan sentence requires an ontological commitment 
to critics, it does not (at least presumably) require an ontological commitment to sets of 
critics. This is the point of departure for Boolos and others who reject Quine’s 
introduction of sets. The concern is that Quine’s account is not ontologically innocent and 
the introduction of sets is a violation of intuition. Boolos proclaims, “It is haywire to 
think that when you have some Cheerios, you are eating  set – what you’re doing is: 
eating THE CHEERIOS” (Boolos 1984, 448). 
Boolos is not denying the existence of sets, but Boolos does not agree that the 
plural locution ‘some critics’ entails a commitment to a set of critics. Thus, unlike Quine 




second-order logic can be interpreted in an ontologically innocent way with the use of 
plural quantification. That is, if plural quantification is ontologically innocent, then 
second-order sentences can be translated without being committed to the existence of 
anything beyond what is required in first-order logic. Boolos writes, “…neither the use of 
plurals nor the employment of second-order logic commits us to the existence of extra 
items beyond those to which we are already committed” (Boolos 1984, 449).  
Using (GK) and other sentences, Boolos defended plural q antification as a way 
to interpret plural locutions in an ontologically innocent way.8 Specifically, ontologically 
innocent plural quantification can be used to quantify over pluralities without a 
commitment to collections. Boolos writes, “Abandon, if one ever had it, the id a that use 
of plural forms must always be understood to commit one to the existence of sets (or 
‘classes,’ ‘collections,’ or ‘totalities’)…” (Boolos 1984, 442). 
Accordingly, Boolos interpreted the Geach-Kaplan setence in such a way that a 
commitment to sets was not required. For Boolos, the locution ‘some critics’ is a plural 
locution that should be translated as quantification over a plurality. Using plural 
quantification, Boolos symbolized (GK) as follows: 
(4) (∃)(∃)	&	()()(	&		 → 	 ≠ 	&	) (Boolos 1984, 432) 
The capital ‘X’ is the variable that Boolos uses for plural quantification. It is the variable 
used to indicate that the existential quantifier is quantifying over a plurality rather than an 
individual non-empty set. If the domain of discourse i  critics then ‘∃X’ can be read as 
‘there are some critics’. Thus, (4) is to be read: There are some critics such that, there is 
                                                 
8 The two most relevant articles by Boolos are (1984) and (1985). For a single volume collection of 




at least one y that is one of them and for all x and all y; if x is one of them and x admires y, 
then x is not y, and y is one of them. This reading, Boolos would claim, is identical to the 
natural language expression. That is, the reading of (4), like (GK), does not require set-
like language. Rather, the plural locutions ‘some critics’ and ‘one of them’ are used.  
However, Boolos’s claim that plural locutions do not require set-like language has 
a number of critics. The success of Boolos’s project is ontroversial and the subject of a 
significant body of literature on the matter.9 In the next section I look specifically at a 
paper by Michael Resnik (1988) where he offers what I consider to be a successful 
refutation of Boolos’s views on ontologically innocent plural quantification. Resnik 
argues that his intuitions lead to the opposite conclusion of Boolos, namely, that plural 
locutions can only be understood as having a set-theoretic structure. Thus, Resnik argues 
that plural quantification is not ontologically innocent. I turn now to an analysis of 
Resnik’s criticisms of Boolos.   
I.V – Against Ontologically Innocent Plural Quantification 
 To begin, Resnik summarizes Boolos’s argument. For the first premise in 
Boolos’s argument, Resnik offers the following: 
We need not posit classes or collections in order to render second-order sentences 
intelligible. We can simply translate them into ordinary language using plural 
quantifiers (Resnik 1988, 75). 
Unlike Quine, Boolos defends an ontologically innocent conception of second-order logic 
using plural quantification. That is, using plural quantifiers, the Geach-Kaplan sentence 
                                                 
9 For a critical view of plural quantification see Hazen (1993); Laycock (2006); Linnebo (2003); Parsons 
(1990); Quine (1986); Resnik (1988); de Roulihan (200 ). For a sympathetic view of plural quantification 




can be accurately translated without the need for acollection of critics. Resnik continues 
with Boolos’s second premise: 
Using plural quantifiers does not commit one to classes or collections. Indeed, it 
does not commit one to anything that one is not already committed to by means 
of one’s use of singular quantifiers (Resnik 1988, 75). 
 Here Resnik is reiterating Boolos’s notion of ontological innocence. Ontological 
innocence does not mean absence of ontological commitment. Rather, ontological 
innocence means that a translation is performed with no net change in ontology. Resnik 
presents Boolos’s conclusion as follows: 
Thus, the use of second-order logic need not commit one to collections or sets. 
Quine is wrong: second-order logic is not class theory in disguise (Resnik 1988, 
75). 
If Boolos is right, then a sentence that is irreducibly second-order can still be interpreted 
in an ontologically innocent way using plural quantification. However, if Boolos’s first 
premise turns out to be incorrect, then Boolos’s argument does not go through. It is the 
first premise that Resnik and others have a problem with. 
 Returning to the Geach-Kaplan sentence, Resnik argues that he is naturally 
inclined to understand the sentence as saying, “There is a nonempty collection of critics 
each member of which admires no one but another member” (Resnik 1988, 77). This is 
an interpretation consistent with Quine’s views on the matter. Resnik argues that the 
sentence ‘There is a nonempty collection of critics’ is the correct way to interpret the 
sentence ‘There are some critics’. However, as I have noted, this interpretation requires a 
commitment to collections which is not an ontologically innocent commitment.  
Both Resnik and Boolos argue that their respective interpretations most accurately 
correspond to the natural language expression. For Bo los, the symbolization should not 




In contrast, Resnik argues that the sentence cannot be correctly understood without set-
theoretic notions. Thus, when symbolizing ‘Some critics’, Boolos uses ‘∃X’ for ‘there are 
some x’s’, and Resnik (the traditional view) uses ‘∃α’ for ‘there is a set α’.  
Resnik’s criticism focuses on the English translation of Boolos’s symbolization 
(4). Resnik interprets (4) as follows:  
There are some critics such that any o e of them admires another critic only if the 
latter is one of them distinct from the former (Resnik 1988, 77; Resnik’s italics). 
This is not uncharitable to Boolos, who offers the following interpretation of his 
symbolization: 
…there are some critics each of whom admires a person only if that person is one 
of them and none of whom admires himself (Boolos 1985, 328). 
Regarding both interpretations, Resnik has the following intuition: 
But this sentence seems to me to refer to collection quite explicitly. How else are 
we to understand the phrase ‘one of them’ other than as referring to some 
collection and as saying that the referent of ‘one’ belongs to it? (Resnik 1988, 77). 
Notice that Boolos uses precisely the same locutions that Resnik finds so problematic; 
namely, ‘one of them’. 
 The intuition that the locution ‘one of them’ refers to a collection may be due in 
part to the typical grammatical usage of ‘them’. ‘Them’ is commonly used as an object 
pronoun in which some antecedent is known from context. However, ‘them’ is unique in 
that it is a plural form of an object pronoun. Thus, for proper pronoun-antecedent 
agreement, the reader would expect the antecedent to be a plurality. In the case of the 
Geach-Kaplan sentence, the antecedent of the plural object pronoun ‘them’ is some 
critics. This is what Boolos has in mind when he writes, “What I ought to be committed 




However, the context in which ‘them’ occurs has ‘them’ following ‘one of’. Here 
‘one’ is indicating that there is numerically one criti  being referred to and ‘of’ serves the 
function of indicating that the one is to be found i  the referent of ‘them’. That is, ‘them’ 
is an anaphor, the cross-reference of which is some coll ction in which the one is to be 
found. In (GK), if the domain of discourse is all criti s, then the anaphor ‘them’ is 
picking out a collection of critics in which the predicate applies to any one of them. The 
locution ‘some critics’ is picking out the collection of critics, out of all critics, in which 
the referent of ‘them’ is to be found. The problem with Boolos’s view is that he has not 
gone far enough in his regimentation of ‘one of them’. If Boolos were to continue 
explicating ‘one of them’, then the next step would be to posit a collection. 
There are many challenges to an ontologically innoce t view of plural 
quantification. The challenge I have addressed is that Boolos’s intuitions are incorrect 
and that upon analysis, second-order sentences require quantification over collections.10 
Thus, plural quantification does not afford the ontological innocence that Boolos claims.  
I.VI – Deflationist on Predicate Equivocation 
I can now return to Sider’s argument and express my concerns more clearly. The 
central claim in Sider’s response to the deflationist argument from equivocation is as 
follows: 
To be sure, he [nihilist] admits simples arranged tablewise (here I quantify 
plurally), but he rejects the existence of (mereological) collections of them (Sider 
2009, 388: brackets mine). 
                                                 
10 In addition to Resnik, Linnebo (2003), Parsons (1990), and Rouilhan (2002) share the intuition that, to be 




Sider is claiming that the nihilist can, using ontologically innocent plural quantification, 
grant the proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’ while denying ‘There 
exists a collection of simples arranged tablewise’. However, I have shown that plural 
quantification is not ontologically innocent. I now consider the implications of such a 
claim. 
 Considering the following two propositions that Sider’s nihilist is making claims 
about. The nihilist claims that the following is the case: 
(5) Some simples are arranged tablewise. 
Additionally, the nihilist claims that the following is not the case: 
(6) Some collection of simples is arranged tablewis. 
These are analogous to P1 and P3, but slight changes have been made to demonstrate the 
parallel analysis with the Geach-Kaplan discussion. The locution ‘there exists’ has been 
interpreted as existential quantification. Hence, th  use of the particular quantifier ‘some’. 
Moreover, the copula has been made explicit to facilit te discussion of the logical 
structure. The significance of using a plural copula in (5) and a singular copula in (6) will 
be addressed in section VIII. 
Given the discussion in sections V and VI, (5) would be analogous to the plural 
quantification interpretation of Boolos, and (6) would be analogous to the traditional 
interpretation of Quine and others. Sider’s argument turns on the nihilist granting the 
proposition ‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’ while denying the proposition ‘Some 




is ontologically innocent. What remains is to show that the quantification in (5) cannot be 
done in an ontologically innocent way. That is, to show that (5) and (6) are synonymous.  
As was the case for the Geach-Kaplan sentence, it will be helpful to symbolize (5). 
Using ‘T’ for the monadic predicate ‘arranged tablewise’, (5) can be symbolized using 
plural quantification as follows: 
(5′) ∃(( →  )) 
With the domain of discourse being all simples, (5′) can be read as: There are some 
simples such that, for any simple that is one of them, that simple is arranged tablewise. 
The locution ‘some simples’ expresses the plural quntification. Consistent with a plural 
quantification interpretation, the locution ‘one of them’ is used. 
 The introduction of ‘one of them’ is required for a correct translation of (5). The 
same intuition that applied to Boolos’s interpretation of the Geach-Kaplan sentence 
applies here. The proper understanding of ‘them’ in ‘one of them’ is to view the referent 
as being a collection. The proposition ‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’ is claiming 
that some group of simples is arranged tablewise. Th  proposition is predicating 
‘arranged tablewise’ onto some simples rather than all simples. The nihilist is surely not 
committed to the claim that all simples are arranged tablewise. That would make for a 
very peculiar reality for the nihilist. What the nihil st has in mind is that, of all the 
simples in reality, there are some that form a tablewise arrangement. That is, the nihilist 
is trying to pick out some collection of simples. Thus, the proposition ‘Some simples are 
arranged tablewise’ can be seen as a paraphrase of th  proposition ‘Some collection of 




 Thus, analogous to the conclusion about (GK), (5) requires a commitment to 
collections despite the absence of the term ‘collection’. The proposition ‘Some simples 
are arranged tablewise’ cannot be explicated without relying on set-like language. The 
plural pronouns are the natural language devices usd to colloquially express what the 
logic makes explicit. While (5) and (6) are different sentences, they express the same 
proposition.  
Sider’s response to the deflationist rests on ontolgically innocent plural 
quantification. Since plural quantification is not ontologically innocent, (5) and (6) are 
synonymous. Thus, by granting the proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’ 
the nihilist is also committed to the proposition ‘There exist collections of simples 
arranged tablewise’. Therefore, the deflationist is correct to claim that the nihilist and 
universalist must be disagreeing because of an equivocation on the meaning of ‘table’.  
I.VII – Collective Predication 
 There is an additional concern that Sider must address to be successful in refuting 
the deflationist argument. The discussion in section VI focused on the parallel between 
(GK) and the proposition ‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’. I concluded that since 
plural quantification is not ontologically innocent, the proposition ‘There exist simples 
arranged tablewise’ is synonymous with the proposition ‘There exist a collection of 
simples arranged tablewise’. However, there is a problem with Sider’s sentences that is 
not a problem for the Geach-Kaplan sentence, namely, the nature of the predication in 




 The proposition ‘Some simples are arranged tablewis ’ (5) is symbolized by (5′). 
Recall that, if the domain of discourse is all simples, (5′) may be read as follows: There 
are some simples such that, for any simple; if the simple is one of them, then the simple is 
arranged tablewise. Thus, the proposition ‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’ has the 
same meaning as the proposition ‘There are some simples such that, for any simple; if the 
simple is one of them, then the simple is arranged tablewise’. 
 I have highlighted the two concerns I have with the proposition ‘Some simples are 
arranged tablewise’. The first is that the problematic plural locution ‘one of them’ is 
involved. Second, and the focus of this section, is that a plural quantification reading of 
the proposition ‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’ entails a commitment to the 
proposition ‘The simple is arranged tablewise’. The proposition ‘The simple is arranged 
tablewise’ is problematic. Even if plural quantification was ontologically innocent, the 
nihilist is committed to predicating ‘arranged tablewise’ onto individual simples. I am 
going to argue that an individual simple cannot have ‘ rranged tablewise’ as a predicate, 
but first I need to address the type of predication involved. The two types I will discuss 
are distributive and collective predication. 
In explicating collective and distributive predication, I will consider a 
paradigmatic case of each type. This will make the distinction perspicuous enough for my 
purposes.11 The sentence ‘Some students are philosophers’ is an ex mple of distributive 
predication. The predicate can be applied iteratively. The sentence is an ellipsis of 
“student1 is a philosopher, student2 is a philosopher, … studentn is a philosopher.” The 
attribute ‘philosopher’ applies to students individually.  
                                                 
11 For a fuller discussion of plural predication see McKay (2006); Yi (2005, 2006); Massey (1976); Nicolas 




The predicate ‘is a philosopher’ is a first-order monadic predicate. It is an 
attribute that applies to individual things one by one. While a first-order monadic 
predicate may be true of many things, it is true of them individually. Thus, although the 
sentence is picking out some particular set of students, it is predicating of those students 
an attribute that each one of them has. A plural quntification (innocent or otherwise) 
interpretation of this sentence would be successful. So plural quantification can be 
considered when a predicate is distributive. That is, the proposition ‘Some students are 
philosophers’ can be read as: Some students are such that each one of them is a 
philosopher. 
The sentence ‘Some students are surrounding Eddy Hall’ is n example of non-
distributive or collective predication. The predicate must be applied collectively rather 
than iteratively. The sentence must mean that the students are collectively surrounding 
Eddy Hall since the sentence cannot be interpreted as: There is a group of students and 
each one of them is surrounding Eddy Hall. Moreover, the sentence is grammatical even 
though the predicate does not distribute. When a sentence has a collective predicate, the 
sentence cannot be symbolized using plural quantifica on. Plural quantification entails 
the locution ‘one of them’ and a collective predicate cannot apply to an individual.  
Even if Sider tried to reword the sentence, the problematic locution ‘one of them’ 
would remain. For example, Sider could argue that te proposition ‘Some simples are 
arranged tablewise’ is a paraphrase for ‘Some simples are in a tablewise arrangement 
with one another’. This may appear to generate a distributive predicate, but like (GK), 
this sentence entails the problematic locution ‘one f them’. The sentence should be read 




them then x is in a tablewise arrangement with y. Adding a relational predicate will do no 
work for Sider. Just like the Geach-Kaplan sentence, ‘one of them’ must be understood as 
explicitly referring to a collection.  
Rewording will not change the type of predication. I consider the proposition 
‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’ to be a proposition that involves collective 
predication. That is, I consider ‘arranged tablewis’ to be a collective predicate in the 
same way ‘surrounding Eddy Hall’ is a collective prdicate. The predicate cannot apply 
to individuals, but rather must apply to a collection as a whole. This is why using plural 
quantification to symbolize the sentence ‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’ was 
unsuccessful. The ‘arranged tablewise’ predicate cannot be iteratively applied to students. 
The sentence ‘Some simples are arranged tablewise’ is not an ellipsis for “Simple1 is 
arranged tablewise, Simple2 is arranged tablewise, … Simplen is arranged tablewise”. 
Thus, the predicate must be collective.  Since plural quantification requires a distributive 
predicate, trying to symbolize the sentence ‘Some si ples are arranged tablewise’ with 
plural quantification (innocent or otherwise) simply will not work. 
I.VIII – Predicate Equivocation Maintained 
The deflationist that Sider is addressing is concered about ontological debates 
being merely verbal. Certain ontological debates, the deflationist argues, are simply a 
matter of the ontologists talking past one another. In this paper, I have discussed Sider’s 
defense of the ontological debate about composite mat rial objects. As an ontological 




That is, the debate about the ontological status of a table is meaningful and the 
universalist and nihilist have genuinely opposing positions. 
 The nihilist and universalist disagree on whether or not a table exists. The 
deflationist argument from equivocation states thate debate is only apparent because 
the ontologists are equivocating on the meaning of ‘collection’ in the definition of ‘table’. 
Sider disagrees with the deflationist and argues that the ontologists agree on ‘table’ 
defined as a collection of simples arranged tablewis , but do not agree on whether 
something counts as a table. The deflationist does n t think the nihilist can deny the 
existence of tables if they are defined as collections of simples arranged tablewise. 
Sider’s response to the deflationist is that, using plural quantification, the nihilist can 
grant the proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’ and deny the proposition 
‘There exists a collection of simples arranged tablewise’. 
 It turns out that there are a couple of related problems for Sider’s nihilist: the 
ontological innocence of plural quantification and the nature of the predication in the 
proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’. I argued in section III that Sider’s 
nihilist requires plural quantification to be ontologically innocent, since if plural 
quantification is not ontologically innocent, then the nihilist will be committed to a 
collection when asserting the proposition ‘There exist simples arranged tablewise’. 
 In section IV, I evaluated the plural quantification and its ontological innocence. I 
briefly discussed the two major traditions associated with plural quantification. Quine’s 
view represented the position of second-order logic be ng reduced to first-order logic 
with the addition of set theory. However, Boolos and others have argued that 




irreducibly second-order sentences. Boolos used the Geach-Kaplan sentence in his proof 
of the ontological innocence of plural quantification, yet in section V, I looked at 
criticisms by Resnik where Resnik argues that Boolos’s understanding of the Geach-
Kaplan sentence is incorrect. The conclusion I reach d was that plural quantification is 
not ontologically innocent. 
 Thus, as I show in section VI, Sider’s response to the deflationist is untenable. 
Since plural quantification is not ontologically innocent, the proposition ‘There exist 
simples arranged tablewise’ is synonymous with ‘There exist collections of simples 
arranged tablewise’. The nihilist cannot grant the existence of simples arranged tablewise 
and deny the existence of a collection. Therefore, if the nihilist accepts the definition of 
‘table’, as Sider claims, then the nihilist would be committed to the existence of tables. 
Hence, the deflationist argument from equivocation still holds. The ontologists must 
disagree on the meaning of ‘table’. 
 The second concern I addressed regarding Sider’s argument was the nature of 
predication in the sentences he chose. Sider’s nihilist uses plural quantification to 
interpret a sentence in which the predicate does not distribute. In section VII, I show that 
a distributive predicate is needed for plural quantification and that the nihilist’s sentence 
contains a collective predicate. The goal of plural quantification is to avoid a commitment 
to collections, yet a collection is required with a collective predicate. A collective 
predicate is by definition a predicate that applies to a collection. Thus, Sider’s nihilist 





 Plural quantification is not ontologically innocent; thus, using plural 
quantification will commit the nihilist to a collection. The nihilist’s sentence ‘Some 
simples are arranged tablewise’ has a collective predicate; thus, a commitment to simples 
arranged tablewise entails a commitment to a collection. If the nihilist is committed to a 
collection then the deflationist is right to argue that the proposition ‘There exist simples 
arranged tablewise’ is synonymous with the proposition ‘There exists a collection of 
simples arranged tablewise’. Thus, Sider’s response to the deflationist argument from 





CHAPTER TWO: MEREOLOGICAL COLLECTIONS AND VAGUENESS 
 
II.I– Mereological Collection 
 In the first chapter, I argued that plural quantification is not ontologically 
innocent; thus, Sider (2009) was not successful in b ocking the deflationist argument 
from equivocation. In this chapter I want to show that Sider's response to the deflationist 
is not successful for a different reason, namely, because the substantive ontological 
debate he tries to defend rests on an equivocation. 
Sider responds to the ontological deflationist by defending the substantive nature 
of a paradigmatic ontological argument about composite material objects. The debate that 
Sider presents is about the ontological status of composite material objects, specifically, 
the ontological status of a table. Sider's strategy is to choose an actual debate between 
two ontologists and then show that the debate is sub tantive. In the first chapter, I argued 
against Sider's claim that the ontologists could employ plural quantification to avoid the 
criticism that they are equivocating over the predicate 'is a table'. 
Sider argues that it is a fact of the matter that Dvid Lewis and van Inwagen 
disagree on the ontological status of tables, and they do so for a reason other than 
equivocation on the word 'table'. In this chapter, I will investigate Sider's claim that the 
ontologists agree on the meaning of the word 'table', ut disagree over whether or not the 




'table' if the word does in fact denote something. As a pre-theoretic formulation of the 
ontological argument, take David Lewis (Sider’s DKL) to be arguing for the existence of 
tables, and Peter van Inwagen (Sider’s PVI) to be arguing against the existence of tables.  
The deflationist claims that the debate is merely vrbal and that the ontologists are 
equivocating on one or more of the essential terms in the argument. Specifically, the 
deflationist attempts to show that the disagreement b tween the ontologists is due to the 
ontologists using different definitions of ‘table’. Since this is an ontological debate about 
composite material objects, ‘table’ is defined in terms of a collection as follows: 
x is a table =df  x is a collection of simples arranged tablewise (Sider 2009, 388) 
So the debate is over whether or not something counts as a collection of simples arranged 
tablewise. The debate, then, can be restated as follows: Lewis admits the existence of 
tables since he admits the existence of a collection of simples arranged tablewise, but van 
Inwagen denies the existence of tables because van Inwagen does not admit the existence 
of a collection of simples arranged tablewise.  
The deflationist claims that they each mean something d fferent by ‘collection’. 
The deflationist, according to Sider, is “trying to show that the appearance of ontological 
disagreement arises from PVI’s idiosyncratic use of ‘table’” (Sider 2009, 390). Sider 
argues that the ontologists agree on the meaning of the word 'table', but I will argue that 
David Lewis and van Inwagen would not agree. Thus, I argue that the deflationist 
argument from predicate equivocation goes through because the two ontologists do in 
fact disagree on the meaning of 'table'. Sider tries to forestall such an objection by 
discussing three candidate meanings of the word 'collecti n', and showing that in each 




turn now to an account of the three candidate meanings and how they fit in the context of 
the debate.  
II.II – Candidate Meanings for 'Collection' 
The three candidate meanings are succinctly presentd by Sider in the following:: 
[3] interpreting ‘table’ as ‘thing whose parts are simples arranged tablewise’ does 
not secure the synonymy between these sentences; [2] interpreting ‘table’ as ‘set 
whose members are simples arranged tablewise’ is clearly not what DKL (or PVI) 
means by ‘table’; [1] interpreting ‘table’ as ‘simples arranged tablewise’ violates 
grammar. (Sider 2009, 390; my numbering) 
The numbers correspond to my definitions below. These three candidate interpretations 
will serve as the focus of this chapter. My aim is to investigate the three definitions of 
‘table’ and express my concerns with the unique notio  of ‘collection’ involved in each. 
These concerns will be directed at Sider’s response to the deflationist for each definition 
of ‘table’. 
 Each definition will involve a notion of ‘collection’ that is consistent with David 
Lewis’s views on the matter. Sider is clear that Lewis’s meaning of ‘collection’ in the 
definition of ‘table’ is what is under consideration. That is, Sider is basing the 
disagreement between the ontologists on an “interpretation of ‘collection’ under which 
DKL’s ‘table’ is plausibly taken as meaning ‘collection of simples arranged tablewise’” 
(Sider 2009, 388). Accordingly, Sider uses Lewis’s views as the central point of 
consideration for each definition of ‘table’, and I will do the same in this chapter. 
 Based on the three options given above, and using Lewis's terminology, the 
following are the labels for each candidate definitio :  
(1) Composition as Identity: x is a table =df  x is simples arranged tablewise 





(3) Mereological: x is a table =df  x is a mereological collection of simples arranged 
tablewise 
It will be helpful to briefly explicate what the deflationist has in mind with each of the 
three definitions before looking at Sider’s response. 
 The Composition as Identity (1) definition is simply stating that the word 
‘collection’ should be removed from the definition. Here the deflationist would argue that 
PVI’s rejection of collections is not sufficient toavoid a commitment to tables. Thus, the 
argument is merely verbal because given this definition of table, both ontologists are 
committed to their existence. 
 The set-theoretic (2) definition of table is stating that ‘collection’ should be 
understood as a set whose members are simples arranged tablewise. The deflationist 
would argue that if DKL has a set-theoretic definition in mind, and PVI is committed to a 
set of simples arranged tablewise, then PVI cannot av id a commitment to tables. Once 
again, the deflationist would argue that both ontologists would be committed to tables if 
they were both committed to sets of simples arranged tablewise.  
 Finally, the mereological (3) definition is one in which ‘collection’ is to be 
understood as a fusion or whole whose parts are simples arranged tablewise. The 
deflationist (according to Sider) would argue that if DKL has a mereological notion of 
‘collection’ in mind, then PVI would be committed to the existence of tables. This 
commitment follows from PVI admitting the existence of a mereological fusion of 
simples arranged tablewise. 
 In all three cases, the goal of the deflationist is to show that the debate is merely 
verbal. That is, the deflationist will argue that in each case, if the definition of ‘table’ is 




status of tables. Sider argues against each position in turn. Sider’s strategy is to highlight 
a misunderstanding by the deflationist in each case. In what follows, I will evaluate 
Sider’s response to the deflationist’s three candidates for the definition of ‘table’.  
 In each case, I will express my concerns for Sider’s r sponse and investigate the 
issues more deeply to offer either support or criticism of Sider’s understanding of the 
deflationist position. In what follows, I investigate the three interpretations in numerical 
order as presented above. I will place special emphasis on the mereological interpretation 
since I aim to show that the mereological interpretation is the one on which the 
ontologists cannot agree.  
II.III – Collection: Candidate Meaning One 
 For the Composition as Identity (1) candidate meaning, Sider writes the 
following: 
By ‘collection of simples arranged tablewise’, could the author of the paragraph 
mean simply: ‘simples arranged tablewise’? In that case the definition is 
ungrammatical: ‘x is a table iff x is simples arranged tablewise’. (Sider 2009, 389) 
Here Sider’s main concern is that the result of removing ‘collection’ will be that the 
singular verb ‘is’ will be followed by ‘simples arranged tablewise’ which is a plural noun 
phrase. Thus, Sider is claiming that the word ‘collection’ is necessary for the definition to 
be grammatical. Sider's claim is that using the singular noun ‘collection’ is required to 
grammatically and correctly refer to the plurality of simples arranged tablewise. The 
issue that the grammar brings to the surface is the problem of referring to a plurality.  
 The strategy for the deflationist is to appeal to Composition as Identity which will 
allow an interpretation of the ‘is’ not as predicaton, but as the ‘is’ of identity. That is, 
Composition as Identity allows for a table to be idntical to that which it is composed of. 




singular and plural language is not problematic if the principle of Composition as Identity 
is introduced. Sider captures why that is the case and offers a response in the following: 
Believers in “composition as identity” obliterate the metaphysical distinction 
between one and many, and so may wish to introduce a language that makes no 
grammatical distinction between singular and plural… But I doubt that our neo-
Carnapian deflationist plans to convince us that the dispute between the 
metaphysicians PVI and DKL is merely verbal by first convincing us of the truth 
of composition as identity. (Sider 2009, 389 fn. 19)
From this, I gather that Sider’s response to the removal of the word ‘collection’ is in two 
parts. First, without ‘collection’ the definition is ungrammatical and second, Composition 
as Identity is likely not what the deflationist has in mind. The former warrants 
investigation, but not before the latter is addressed. 
 The reason I disagree that the deflationist would not appeal to Composition as 
Identity has to do with the philosophical views of the ontologists that Sider chooses. 
Sider is correct to choose David Lewis (DKL) and Peter van Inwagen (PVI) as 
representing (at least regarding composite material objects) opposing philosophical 
viewpoints. However, in choosing to use philosophers and their viewpoints for his 
debate, Sider invites the deflationist to consider th ir views as well.  
 I find it reasonable then to consider the ontologist's (especially David Lewis's) 
philosophical views when investigating Sider's argument. I take the following quotes to 
show that Sider supports this approach and relies on the philosophical views of David 
Lewis: 
...at least, not given the interpretation of 'collection' under which DKL's 'table' is 
plausibly taken as meaning... 
...it's clear that DKL does not mean by 'table': set-th oretic collection... (Sider 
2009, 388–389) 
Accordingly, the actual views of David Lewis are central to Sider’s discussion as well as 




appeal to the principle of Composition as Identity, since that principle is central to 
Lewis’s views on composition. 
 It is the case that the Composition as Identity thesis is central to Lewis’s 
mereology. Thus, if Lewis’s definition of ‘table’ is the definition to be agreed on by the 
ontologists, then the deflationist is correct to claim that ‘collection’ should be understood 
in light of the Composition as Identity principle. In appealing to this principle the 
deflationist would argue that there is no grammatical concern since Composition as 
Identity allows a table to be identified with that which composes it. By identifying ‘table’ 
with ‘simples arranged tablewise’, the word ‘collection’ is no longer needed. This is at 
least the strategy the deflationist would have in mi d by appealing to Composition as 
Identity.  
 However, this is not to say that Composition as Identity is necessary for the 
deflationist conclusion. Rather, it is sufficient. If 'table' is defined as simples arranged 
tablewise, then Sider writes, "PVI cannot coherently deny 'There exist tables' while 
accepting that some particles are arranged tablewise" (Sider 2009, 389). With the 
principle of Composition as Identity, that is how 'table' would be defined. Thus, if the 
ontologists agreed on Lewis's definition of 'table' th re would not be a substantive debate. 
That is, candidate definition (1) is a possible meaning under which the deflationist 
argument would go through.  
 Appealing to the principle of Composition as Identity—candidate definition (1)—
is sufficient, but not necessary, for the deflationist argument to go through. The point I 
am making here is that Sider should not simply dismis  the deflationist's appeal to 
Composition as Identity, since such an appeal could be a successful strategy. However, 




easily, I want to show an alternative reason why candidate definition (1) is not a live 
option. I will not reject the deflationist's appeal to the principle, rather I will show that 
appealing to Composition as Identity will in fact not achieve the deflationist goal. 
 My aim is to show that even if the deflationist appeals to Composition as Identity, 
the deflationist will still fail in proving the debate is verbal. Again, this will only show 
that (1) is not a candidate meaning that the deflationist can appeal to in support of their 
argument. In later sections I will look at whether or not (2) and (3) are live options for the 
deflationist. 
 If I am successful in showing that an appeal to Comp sition as Identity will not 
support the deflationist goal, then I will have shown that Sider is right (although for 
reasons different than what he offers) to deny the deflationist the first candidate 
definition: Composition as Identity (1). To begin, I will explicate and provide a critical 
analysis of the Composition as Identity thesis. 
II.IV – Composition as Identity 
David Lewis describes Composition as Identity as follows: 
I say that composition – the relation of a part to whole, or, better, the many-one 
relation of many parts to their fusion - is like identity... Call this the Thesis of 
Composition as Identity. It is in virtue of this thesis that mereology is 
ontologically innocent: it commits us only to things that are identical, so to speak, 
to what we were committed to before. (Lewis 1991, 82).
For Lewis, the Composition as Identity thesis state that a mereological fusion is nothing 
over and above its proper parts. For example, given a commitment to the existence of my 
keyboard and pencil, it is no further ontological commitment to accept a fusion of my 
keyboard and pencil. I am ontologically committed to the keyboard-pencil fusion as soon 




As Lewis remarks, it would be "double counting" to add the keyboard-pencil 
fusion to my ontology. One might consider the keyboard-pencil as a way of referring to a 
plurality using a singular notion. Even stronger, the Composition as Identity thesis claims 
that the keyboard-pencil is, in some way, identical to the keyboard and pencil. Lewis 
characterizes this identity as follows: 
...given a prior commitment to cats, say, a commitment to cat-fusions is not a 
further commitment. The fusion is nothing over and above the cats that compose 
it. It just is them. They just are it. (Lewis 1991, 81) 
I take Lewis to be identifying a fusion with its mebers in a very strong way. The ‘is’ in 
the quote is the ‘is’ of identity. The ‘are’ is supposed to be like the ‘are’ of identity. If a 
fusion is identical to its members, then there would be no need to use ‘collection’ to refer 
to the members since the collection and the members ar  in some sense identical.12 
 Regarding Sider’s ontological debate, Lewis would argue that, granting the 
composition as identity thesis, it would be double counting to count the simples-
arranged-tablewise fusion in addition to the simples arranged tablewise. The simples-
arranged-tablewise fusion just i  the simples arranged tablewise. For Lewis, if one is 
already committed to simples arranged tablewise, then it is no further commitment to 
accept the existence of mereological collections of imples arranged tablewise. Thus, the 
word ‘collection’ would be redundant in Lewis’s definition of ‘table’. 
 For Lewis, mereology is ontologically innocent because of the principle of 
Composition as Identity. Roughly, according to Lewis’s mereology, a fusion is posited 
when things compose something. According to the principle of Composition as Identity, a 
commitment to the fusion is an ontologically innocent because it just is (in some sense) 
identical to those things which compose it.  
                                                 
12 Lewis is not alone in his view. Similar composition as identity claims are made in Armstrong (1978), 




  This would be an easy (too easy I think) response by the deflationist to Sider. The 
deflationist could argue that, since mereology is ontologically innocent for Lewis, there is 
no reason to debate the existence of a mereological fusion because it is nothing over and 
above its parts. This would result in a debate that is merely verbal, but success for the 
deflationist depends on an acceptable defense of Lewis’s Composition as Identity thesis. 
If the Composition as Identity thesis is denied, then mereology is not ontologically 
innocent for Lewis. In the next section, I will foll w Byeong-Uk Yi (1999) and argue that 
Lewis’s argument for Composition as Identity is problematic.  
II.V – Against Ontological Innocence of the Composition Relation 
 Byeong-Uk Yi (1999) calls Lewis's view the "Innocen  Conception of 
Mereology" according to which, "one who accepts mereology makes no ontological 
commitment beyond the one that he has made independntly of doing so." In contrast, Yi 
argues that a mereological commitment is a further ontological commitment. That is, 
mereology is not ontologically innocent. A mereological fusion on this account would be 
something over and above its proper parts.  
 However, for Lewis, composition is the relation that allows a composite to be 
nothing more than the sum of its parts. The following quote captures what Lewis has in 
mind: 
The ‘are’ of composition is, so to speak, the plural form of the ‘is’ of identity. 
(Lewis 1991, 82) 
The Composition as Identity thesis can be thought of as the ‘are’ of identity. The question 




identity. I agree with Yi that Composition as Identity is not ontologically innocent and 
that Lewis’s argument for its innocence is problematic.13 
 To begin, Yi separates the composition thesis into a strong and weak version. The 
strong version is such that a mereological fusion is strictly and literally identical to its 
constituent parts. Lewis defines strict identity as "ordinary identity, the one-one relation 
that each thing bears to itself and to nothing else" (L wis 1991, 84). I mention this strong 
sense only for completeness and to provide context for what Lewis has in mind in the 
weak sense of identity. Lewis thought that the strong version was too contentious and 
opted to construct his Composition as Identity thesis u ing a less restrictive notion of 
identity. 
 This less restrictive notion of identity is what Lewis calls "identity in the 
broadened sense" (Lewis 1991, 85). This broadened sense of identity is the basis of the 
weaker form of the composition as identity thesis. In the weaker version, the identity of 
composition is analogous to the strict and literal identity of logic. In discussing this form 
of the identity thesis, Lewis writes the following: 
...the mereological relations (however restated) are something special... they are 
strikingly analogous to ordinary identity... So striking is this analogy that it is 
appropriate to mark it by speaking of mereological relations – the many-one 
relation of composition, the one-one relations of part to whole and of overlap – as 
kinds of identity. (Lewis 1991, 84) 
I am highlighting Lewis's use of analogy because this is where the criticisms will focus. 
Yi accurately captures Lewis's use of this analogy and provides a list of propositions to 
explicate the flaw in Lewis's reasoning. 
 
  
                                                 
13 For additional discussion critical of Composition as Identity see Koslicki (2008), Oliver (1994), Sider 
(2007b), van Inwagen (1994). For additional discussion in support of Composition as Identity see 




 The following propositions are adopted from Yi (1999, 152): 
(i) There is a cat. 
(ii)  There is a mouse. 
(iii)  There is something that the cat and the mouse are. 
(iv) There is something that the cat is. 
The 'are' in (iii) is the composition relation. That is, (iii) may be read as: There is 
something that the cat and the mouse compose. Lewis argues that by asserting (i), 
asserting (iv) becomes redundant. To say, 'There is a cat' is equivalent to saying 
'Something is a cat'. Accordingly, Lewis would argue that (iv) is redundant given (i) 
because they express the same proposition. In granting (i), there is no additional 
ontological commitment in granting (iv). 
 Lewis’s argument continues by claiming that the same reasoning applies to the 
composition relation, the ‘are’ of composition. For Lewis, the composition relation, as in 
(iii) is analogous enough to ordinary identity to be treated as a kind of identity. The 
analogy is so strong between the two that they perform the same function in the type of 
reasoning above.  
Lewis argues that because 'are' in (iii) is “so strikingly” analogous to 'is' in (iv), 
that (iii) is an ontologically innocent assertion in the same way (iv) is. For Lewis, 
asserting that there is a cat and mouse is ontologically equivalent to asserting that there is 
something that the cat and the mouse compose, because asserting that there is a cat is 
ontologically equivalent to asserting that something is a cat. 
Lewis’s argument turns on the analogy between the composition predicate in (iii) 
‘something that the cat and mouse are’ and the identity predicate in (iv) ‘something that 




enough to allow composition to be ontologically innocent like identity. Thus, Lewis 
argues that the analogy is strong enough to support the aptly named Composition as 
Identity thesis. 
To try and reinforce this claim, Lewis offers a number of respects in which the 
composition relation is analogous to the identity relation (1991, 85ff.). The first is 
Unrestricted Composition, which states anytime there is a cat, there is something 
identical to the cat. Analogously, anytime there is a cat and a mouse, there is something 
that is identical to the fusion of the cat and mouse. 
Second, Uniqueness of Composition, states that two different things cannot be 
identical to a particular cat in the same way that wo different things cannot be identical 
to the particular fusion of a cat and mouse. The last two are, Ease of Describing Fusions 
and Coincidence of Location. These state that a full description of a particular cat, 
including its location, fully describes that which is identical to the cat. Analogously, a 
fully described fusion is identical to the full description of the parts.  
Whether or not these analogies hold is not currently under investigation. Lewis's 
argument is that if these analogies hold, then composition and identity are analogous in 
another respect, namely, ontological innocence. The problem here is that an argument 
from analogy, where the four respects characterize the analogy, is not sufficient to claim 
that composition is ontologically innocent. This argument simply does not work. None of 
the respects in which composition is analogous to identity logically entails ontological 
innocence for composition. Yi concludes that the argument from analogy is a “non-
sequitur” and involves a “flagrant fallacy” (Yi 199, 153). 
 So either Lewis’s argument begs the question or it rests on faulty reasoning. 




successful. The Composition as Identity thesis does n t obtain; thus, a commitment to a 
fusion is not an ontologically innocent commitment. The word ‘collection’ is not 
redundant and cannot be removed from the definition of ‘table’. Thus, candidate 
definition (1) does not support the deflationist con lusion. Thus, the first of the three 
candidate definitions for the deflationist has been shown to not achieve the deflationists 
goal. However, any of the three would be sufficient for the deflationist. I turn now to the 
second candidate definition: set-theoretic. 
II.VI – Collection: Candidate Meaning Two 
Regarding the set-theoretic definition of ‘table’, what the deflationist has in mind 
is that the debate will be verbal if Lewis’s definition of ‘table’ is set-theoretic and van 
Inwagen is committed to set. When considering whether or not Lewis’s definition of 
‘table’ is set-theoretic, Sider writes, “it’s clear that DKL does not mean by ‘table’: set-
theoretic collection of simples arranged tablewise” (Sider 2009, 389). Sider goes on to 
say that DKL and PVI are “perfectly clear on the distinction between parthood and set-
membership (Sider 2009, 389). 
This captures most of the discussion Sider provides regarding the set-theoretic 
interpretation. My presentation will be similarly brief, since here I agree with Sider that 
the deflationist would be mistaken to think that the definition of ‘table’ that the 
ontologists have in mind is set-theoretic. To be sure, Lewis would not have a set-theoretic 
definition in mind. However, the deflationist could argue that, even though Lewis does 
not have a set-theoretic definition in mind, Lewis’s ‘part’ is synonymous with van 
Inwagen’s ‘member’. Then the deflationist would claim that the debate is merely verbal 




The author [deflationist] might reply that DKL means by ‘part’ what PVI means 
by ‘member’. But this would be a mistake, since transitivity is presumably a sort 
of meaning-postulate on DKL’s ‘part’ but not on PVI’s ‘member’. (Sider 2009, 
389 fn. 18) 
 To see what work this is doing for the deflationist, consider once again the 
definition: 
x is a table =df  x is a set-theoretic collection of simples arranged tablewise 
Here it may be helpful to restate the definiens as: x i  a set whose members (the simples) 
are arranged tablewise. The deflationist then claims that, if van Inwagen is committed to 
a set whose members are arranged tablewise, and if Lewis’s ‘part’ is synonymous with 
‘member’, then they both agree on the definition and both are committed to tables. Thus, 
the debate would be verbal because the ontologists are conflating ‘part’ and ‘member’. 
 Sider’s response, seen in the quote above, is that transitivity is a property of 
Lewis's parthood and because of that, Lewis's 'part' and van Inwagen's 'member' cannot 
be synonymous. Here I agree with Sider that the ontol gists are not conflating 'part' and 
'member', but it is worth mentioning that the deflationist may have in mind Lewis’s, 
especially his Parts of Classes (1991), project of reinterpreting set-theoretic axioms using 
his formulation of mereology.14 
Although this does bring together 'part' and 'member', it does not follow that 
Lewis is conflating the two notions. Rather, he does an excellent job of comparing the 
two notions. Similarly, van Inwagen (2006) provides a clear and helpful discussion on the 
distinction between sets and fusions. Thus, when evaluating these ontologists, Sider is 
correct to claim that "DKL (like PVI) is perfectly clear on the distinction between 
parthood and set-membership" (Sider 2009, 389).  For these reasons, I think the 
                                                 




deflationist would be wrong to argue that the ontologists are conflating 'part' and 
'member'.  
 As a final remark before leaving this candidate definition, Sider leaves it an open 
question whether or not van Inwagen believes or is committed to sets and on this point I 
disagree with Sider. I think the deflationist is correct to claim that van Inwagen is 
committed to sets, because van Inwagen is committed to non-ontologically innocent 
plural quantification. Yet, although this is a conclusion favorable to the deflationist 
position, it does not help the deflationist regarding this second candidate definition of 
'table'. 
 I have argued that, even if the deflationist is correct to claim that van Inwagen is 
committed to sets, the conclusion that the debate between the ontoligists is verbal does 
not follow. Sider is correct to claim that Lewis does not have in mind a set-theoretic 
definition of 'table', rather Lewis has a mereological definition in mind. Thus, even if van 
Inwagen is committed to sets, this does not commit hi  to the existence of tables defined 
mereologically. Thus, there would be genuine disagreement between the ontologists. 
 In response, the deflationist might argue that, given Lewis's definition of a 
mereological collection, van Inwagen would be forced to admit the existence of tables 
defined mereologically. This remains to be seen, and will be the subject of investigation 
for the third candidate definition: mereological. 
II.VII – Collection:Candidate Meaning Three 
 Sider argues that "the interpretation of 'collection' under which DKL's 'table' is 
plausibly taken as meaning 'collection of simples arranged tablewise'... is mereological: a 




be claiming that it is Lewis's notion of a mereological 'collection' on which the debate 
between the ontologists is about. Moreover, Sider appe rs to characterize this 
mereological collection as one in which the predicate of the whole (collection of things 
that ϕ) is distributed onto the parts (thing whose parts ϕ). Later Sider writes, "When 
DKL says that there are tables, he is clear that he means: there are things whose parts are 
simples arranged tablewise" (Sider 2009, 389) 
 So Sider has a specific understanding of a mereological collection where the 
property of the collection is also a property of the individual parts. That is, Sider has 
distributive predication in mind, but this is problematic when a collective property such 
as "arranged tablewise" is being discussed. However, this may be a misrepresentation of 
what Sider is trying to express. Moreover, it's not clear that Lewis has such a requirement 
for his notion of a mereological collection. It's certainly not a result of any of his three 
axioms of mereology (Lewis 1991, 74). As a result, I want to offer a different and more 
charitable interpretation of what I think Sider is trying to express. 
  As it turns out, van Inwagen (1990) has a nice discussion of such an 
interpretation. I should note that, in the following discussion of van Inwagen's 
mereological language, much of the language used may be considered unrefined and 
problematic. My goal here is not to critically analyze van Inwagen, but rather offer a 
glimpse of van Inwagen's mereological language so that I may use it to reinterpret Sider's 
claim in a way lacks the obvious predication problems already discussed.  
 In Material Beings (1990), van Inwagen discusses at length, how a nihilist can 
"paraphrase the sentences of ordinary language that most philosophers would say 
expressed facts about things like chairs in language that refers to no material things but 




using plural quantification, using sets, using neith r plural quantifiers nor sets. It is the 
third type (neither plural quantifiers nor sets) that Lewis would offer.15  
 van Inwagen offers a paraphrase that achieves his goal of not being committed to 
anything other than simples while not requiring "the apparatus of plural quantification or 
to assert the existence of sets" (van Inwagen 1990, 110). This is done using spatial 
regions. For an example, van Inwagen writes the following: 
...one might render 'Some chairs are heavier than some tables' in this way: 
There is an x such that x is a region of space and the things that fall within x are 
arranged chairwise and there is a y such that y is a region of space and the things 
that fall within y are arranged tablewise and the that fall within x are heavier than 
the things that fall within y. (van Inwagen 1990, 110) 
 Using van Inwagen's spatial region interpretation scheme, I can return to Sider 
and more accurately capture what he has in mind. In saying that Lewis's understanding of 
table is, "things whose parts are simples arranged tablewise," Sider may have in mind the 
following: a table is to be understood as a region of space where the parts within that 
region of space are arranged tablewise. By using the "region of space" locution of van 
Inwagen, I can interpret Sider in a way that does not attribute to Lewis a commitment to 
ontologically innocent plural quantification. While t is the case that Sider and Lewis 
would both grant ontologically innocent plural quantification, I will table that issue here 
since I have already addressed the consequences in hapter one. 
 Moreover, with the spatial region interpretation, Sider would not be committing 
Lewis to a view where a mereological collection requires a distributive predicate. While 
                                                 
15 For Lewis, plural quantification is not a necessary feature of his ontologically innocent mereology. Lewis 
writes, "Plural quantification is innocent: we have many things, we speak of them as many, in no way do 
we mention one thing that is many taken together. Mereology is innocent in a different way: we have many 
things, we do mention one thing that is the many taken together..." (Lewis 1991, 87). Lewis refers to the 
position that combines plural quantification and mereology as megethology: "Mereology is the theory of 
the relation of part to whole, and kindred notions. Megethology is the result of adding plural 




it may be the case that a distributive predicate is r quired (see chapter one), it is best for 
Sider to leave the question open. Using spatial langu ge to interpret the arrangement 
allows for this. The claim that a certain region of space has within it particles that are 
arranged tablewise, does not mean that the particles must individually  instantiate the 
predicate 'arranged tablewise.' That would be problematic. Rather, the collective 
predicate can apply to the group of particles. 
 With these qualifications, I have tried to offer an interpretation of Sider that is 
charitable in the sense that it avoids the immediat problems already addressed. Thus, I 
take Sider to be saying that Lewis's 'table' should be understood as a mereological 
collection in which the spatial region that the collection identifies is composed of a 
tablewise arrangement of parts. What remains is an account of when a spatial region has 
parts that compose something further. Thus, I return to a discussion of Lewis's 
mereology, but this time I will focus on the axiom of Unrestricted Composition.  
II.VIII – Unrestricted Composition 
 Lewis’s axiom of Unrestricted Composition is stated as follows: “Whenever there 
are some things, then there exists a fusion of those things” (Lewis 1991, 74). This is a 
bare statement of the very strong position expressed by this axiom. Lewis describes the 
axiom and its implications as follows: 
I say that whenever there are some things, they have a fusion. Whenever! It 
doesn’t matter how many or how disparate or scattered o  unrelated they are… 
There is still a fusion. So I am committed to all manner of unheard-of things: 
trout-turkeys, fusions of individuals and classes, all the world’s Styrofoam, and 
many, many more. (Lewis 1991, 80) 
Thus, Lewis’s mereology places no restriction on comp sition. There is no limit to the 




 On this view, whenever there are simples arranged tablewise, there is also a 
fusion of those simples. If a table is defined as a fusion of simples arranged tablewise, 
then Lewis will grant a table in every case there are simples arranged tablewise. That is, 
in any case where there is a spatial region in which s mples are arranged tablewise, there 
is a table fusion. Even if Lewis would not use the language of “simples,” it would not 
matter. Since anything can compose a fusion, and simples arranged tablewise are things, 
then whenever there are simples arranged tablewise ther is a fusion of those things, 
namely, a table. 
 My claim here is that, whatever else might characterize Lewis’s notion of 
mereology, Unrestricted Composition is central to his view. Accordingly, this should be 
taken into consideration when Sider is claiming that e notion of ‘table’ that Lewis has 
in mind is mereological. Sider writes that Lewis’s mereological collection should be 
understood as follows: “a ‘collection’ of things tha  ϕ is a thing whose parts ϕ" (Sider 
2009, 388). My claim is that, in addition, we should take Lewis to be claiming: whenever 
there are parts that ϕ, there is a collection of things that ϕ. Thus, for Lewis, there is a 
table if there are simples arranged tablewise. 
 If that is the case, then Lewis’s mereological definition of ‘table’ is such that a 
commitment to simples arranged tablewise entails a commitment to tables. However, the 
nihilist, according to Sider, does just that. Sider explains: 
DKL’s ‘table’ is plausibly taken as meaning ‘collection of simples arranged 
tablewise’… Since PVI thinks that there are no compsite material objects 
whatsoever, he thinks that there simply are no colle tions of simples arranged 
tablewise. To be sure, he admits simples arranged tablewise (here I quantify 
plurally), but he rejects the existence of (mereological) collections of them. (Sider 
2009, 388–389) 
Here Sider is claiming that the nihilist is admitting simples arranged tablewise and 




would claim that the nihilist is committed to tables if committed to simples arranged 
tablewise. This follows from Lewis’s claim that “whenever there are some things, then 
there exists a fusion of those things” (Lewis 1991, 74). 
 This all seems counterproductive to Sider’s goal. Sider’s argument against the 
deflationist is that the ontologists agree on the definition of ‘table’ but disagree on 
whether or not they exist. If the ontologists accept Lewis’s mereological definition, where 
composition is unrestricted, then the ontologists cannot disagree on whether or not they 
exist. They would both have to agree that tables do exist unless they disagreed on the 
definition of ‘table’, but then that is the deflationist claim. Thus, the deflationist 
conclusion cannot be blocked if the ontologists agree on a definition of 'table', where 
'table' is defined as simples arranged tablewise and composition is unrestricted. Given my 
conclusion in section V that composition is not an ontologically innocent relation, Sider 
has two options: deny that the nihilist admits simples arranged tablewise or refute the 
axiom of Unrestricted Composition. 
 The first option is to say that the nihilist will not admit simples arranged 
tablewise. If that were the case, then the nihilist could deny the existence of tables. 
However, I see no reason for the nihilist to not admit simples arranged tablewise. In his 
discussion on the matter, van Inwagen writes, “I shall elp myself to three variably 
polyadic predicates: ‘are arranged chairwise’, ‘arerranged tablewise’, and ‘are heavier 
than’”(van Inwagen 1990, 109). I see no reason to deny van Inwagen these predicates. 
van Inwagen wants to deny composite material objects, but not simples themselves. 
Moreover, van Inwagen does not want to deny that simples can be arranged tablewise. 
For van Inwagen, simples can be arranged tablewise in the same way they can be 




 Sider’s second option is to deny the axiom of Unrestricted Composition. This is 
problematic for two reasons. First, it would undermine his claim that we are to 
understand ‘table’ as a mereological collection in Lewis’s sense, since Unrestricted 
Composition is an axiom of Lewis’s mereology. Second, Unrestricted Composition, 
although controversial, is a defensible position.16 I say controversial, because many find 
the principle of Unrestricted Composition results in all sorts of strange fusions. 
 These strange fusions are supposed to be sufficient for rejecting Unrestricted 
Composition. Yet, to restrict composition results in problems with vagueness, and it is 
this concern with vagueness on which Lewis (1991) and Sider (2001) defend Unrestricted 
Composition. Specifically, they use what has come to be known as the argument from 
vagueness to show that composition cannot be restricted. I turn now to an analysis and 
defense of the argument from vagueness. 
II.IX – Argument from Vagueness 
 The argument from vagueness attempts to prove that composition must be 
unrestricted by showing that restricting composition is impossible. In this section I will, 
following Lewis (1986) and Sider (2001), defend theargument from vagueness. While 
Lewis does not have a systematic presentation of the argument, the main idea is captured 
in the following: 
To restrict composition in accordance with our intuitions would require a vague 
restriction… But if composition obeys a vague restriction, then it must sometimes 
be a vague matter whether composition takes place or not. And that is impossible. 
(Lewis 1986, 212) 
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A systematic formulation of Lewis’s argument from vagueness is presented by Sider 
(2001). What follows is an analysis of Sider’s presentation of the argument. 
 Sider first premise is as follows: 
P1: If not every class has a fusion, then there must be a pair of cases connected by 
a continuous series such that in one, composition occurs, but in the other, 
composition does not occur. (Sider 2001, 123)  
The notion of continuous series is complex, but Sider's general claim is that, if 
composition is restricted, then there is at least one case in which composition does not 
occur. Restricted composition is not the claim thatere is never fusion, rather it is the 
claim that not every class has a fusion. Thus, if  composition is restricted, then there is at 
least one case where composition occurs and one case where composition does not occur. 
 Sider discusses a couple of objections, whose resolutions should be noted. The 
first is that, a nihilist will not grant this premise. For my discussion of the argument from 
vagueness, I will not address nihilism, since using nihilism to reject the argument from 
vagueness only helps the deflationist. The second objection is that there exists a pair of 
cases not connected by a continuous series, but Sider does not need this to be the case. As 
Sider writes, “PI only requires that some pair of cases differing over composition be 
connected by a continuous series, if composition is restricted” (Sider 2001, 123).  Aside 
from these objections, I can think of no other reason to deny Sider the first premise. 
 Premise two of the argument from vagueness continues with this notion of 
continuous series: 
P2: In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether composition occurs. 
(Sider 2001, 124) 
Here Sider is claiming that a continuous series, as an artificial construct, can be 
considered to have so many members that the member in which composition does not 




is that, in a continuous series, a change in composition must occur gradually. Sider argues 
that, “there would seem to be something ‘metaphysically arbitrary’ about a sharp cut-off 
in a continuous series of cases of composition” (Sider 2001, 124). 
 The third and final premise of the argument from vagueness is as follows: 
P3: In any case of composition, either composition definitely occurs, or 
composition definitely does not occur. (Sider 2001, 125) 
In defense of P3, Sider argues that ‘case’ is to be understood as a class that is defined in 
terms of its members. Thus, a case of composition is a class that has “precisely 
determined membership” (Sider 2001, 125). Sider is try ng to avoid any objection from 
semantic indeterminacy which Lewis spends much timeaddressing in his version of the 
argument. Sider summarizes the view by writing, “There is no vagueness ‘in the world’; 
all vagueness is due to semantic indecision” (Sider 2001, 125). 
 While this may be the case, Sider chooses to strength  the argument by arguing 
for the impossibility of semantic vagueness using numerical sentences. Sider writes, 
“Lewis’s assumptions about vagueness can then be replaced by weaker assumptions that 
concern only logical vocabulary” (Sider 2001, 127). What Sider has in mind is that 
syntactic logical notions are not vague. Sider uses this in a reductio to defend the third 
premise. In short, if the third premise is not the case, then there would be at least one 
logical sentence that is vague. Since, Sider argues, logical sentences cannot be vague, P3 
must be the case. While I have no issues with the claim that logical operators are not 
vague, more should be said about syntactic variables. For example, predicate logic 
contains predicates which may or may not be vague. 
 Sider choose “numerical sentences” to isolate the discussion of predicate 
vagueness. He choose to discuss a sentence making a claim about a finite number of 




concrete objects determinately using predicate logic. In such a case, the logical sentence 
would contain only one predicate, namely, ‘is a concrete object’. To establish the 
conditions under which this predicate obtains, Sider argues that this would be done by 
constructing a determinate list of abstract objects, and claiming that an object not in the 
list is concrete. Thus, to instantiate the predicate ‘is a concrete object’ is to satisfy the 
condition that the object is not included in the list of abstract objects. 
 One might think that Sider is just pushing the problem further down the line. That 
is, being a concrete object will be determinate only if the objects of the list of abstract 
objects are determinate. In response, Sider claims, “the concreteness predicate, ‘C’, 
presumably has precise application conditions since it was defined by a list of predicates 
for fundamental ontological kinds that do not admit of borderline cases” (Sider 2001, 
127).  
What I take Sider to be claiming is that, the conditions for the predicate are 
precisely defined. Vagueness, if it is to be found, cannot come from the specifications 
involved in defining the predicate. However, I agree with Sider that this is the only place 
vagueness can be located. Thus, P3 must be the case. Notice that this results in a 
conclusion contradictory to P2. In P2, composition in a continuous series was claimed to 
occur gradually, yet, in P3 the claim is that compositi n in a continuous series cannot be 
gradual. Together, P2 and P3 negate the consequent of the conditional in P1. Therefore, 
the antecedent, that composition is restricted, must be false. Thus, the argument from 
vagueness concludes that composition must be unrestrict d. 
If composition is unrestricted, then every admission of a plurality of material 
objects results in the admission of a collection. Thus, when Sider’s nihilist admits simples 




nihilist will not accept Unrestricted Composition. This was addressed in the discussion of 
P1. However, Sider’s argument relies on the ontologists using the same definition of 
‘table’, and for Lewis that definition would be in terms of a mereological collection. 
Lewis’s understanding of mereological collection entails Unrestricted Composition. 
Thus, the nihilist must either accept Unrestricted Composition and agree with Lewis on 
the definition of ‘table’, or the nihilist can deny Unrestricted Composition and use a 
different definition of ‘table’. 
If van Inwagen accepts Lewis’s definition of ‘table’, then by admitting simples 
arranged tablewise, van Inwagen is committed to the existence of tables. If van Inwagen 
denies Unrestricted Composition, and if plural quantification is ontologically innocent, 
then van Inwagen can admit simples arranged tablewise and deny the existence of tables. 
However, if van Inwagen denies Unrestricted Composition, then Lewis and van Inwagen 
will not have the same definition of ‘table’. In either case, the deflationist argument from 
equivocation goes through. 
II.X – Predicate Equivocation Maintained 
 My aim in this chapter, has been to show that the deflationist argument from 
equivocation is successful for a reason other than e ontological innocence of plural 
quantification. Sider's main thesis against the deflationist is that the ontologists can agree 
on the definition of 'table' and yet still disagree on their existence. Sider systematically 
presents and argues against three candidate definitions. For each definition, Sider 
attempts to show that either the ontologists do not have that definition in mind or the 




 The three definitions of 'table' are a result of the three interpretations of 
'collection' that occur in the definiens. A necessary condition for being a candidate 
interpretation of 'collection' is that the interpretation corresponds with David Lewis's 
views on the matter, namely, his mereological views. Accordingly, the first candidate 
meaning is one in which the principle of Composition as Identity makes 'collection' 
superfluous. 
 In section IV, I addressed the Composition as Identity thesis states that a 
mereological collection is nothing over and above its parts. The collection is, in a way, 
identical to its parts. Thus, Composition as Identity is required for Lewis's claim that 
mereology is ontologically innocent. The idea is that, given a commitment to some 
things, it is no further commitment to grant a mereological collection of those things. The 
result is that, if van Inwagen asserts the proposition 'There exist simples arranged 
tablewise', then the proposition 'There exists a colle tion of simples arranged tablewise' 
carries no further ontological commitment. Thus, the problem for Sider is that, if 
Composition as Identity is granted, then there is no ubstantive ontological debate. 
 However, in section V, I provide alternative argumentation for why we should not 
accept ontologically innocent mereology. That is, I looked at Byeong-Uk Yi's argument 
against Lewis's defense of Composition as Identity. I conclude that Lewis's argument for 
Composition as Identity is problematic; thus, the composition relation is not ontologically 
innocent in the way that identity is. This helps Sider's case, since Composition as Identity 
is a thesis which supports and is sufficient for the deflationist conclusion. Thus, in 
denying the ontological innocence of the composition relation, I support Sider's goal of 




 The second candidate definition, addressed in section VI, is set-theoretic. That is, 
'table' is to be defined as a set-theoretic collection of members arranged tablewise. There 
is not much to say in regards to this candidate definition, since neither ontologist has a 
set-theoretic definition in mind. Both ontologists are acutely aware of the distinction 
between parthood and set membership and are not conflating the two notions. This 
candidate definition was discussed for completeness, and to show that it is not a live 
option for the deflationist.  
 In section VII, I discuss Lewis's mereological axiom, Unrestricted Composition. 
Whereas, the Composition as Identity principle aims to upport the ontological innocence 
of mereology, Unrestricted Composition aims to provide an account of when a collection 
should be posited. Given Unrestricted Composition, whenever there are some things, 
there is always a collection of those things. Thus, Unrestricted Composition, if granted, 
would require the nihilist to be committed to a collection if committed to simples 
arranged tablewise.  
 While Unrestricted Composition may seem problematic, the consequences of 
restricting composition are even more so. In section IX, I look at Sider's version of the 
argument from vagueness which seeks to prove that composition cannot be restricted. 
The basic strategy of the argument is to grant restricted composition and show that doing 
so entails contradictory propositions. Thus composition cannot be restricted.  
 I have argued against the Composition as Identity pr nciple, concluding that a 
commitment to a mereological collection is not an ontologically innocent commitment. 
Further, I have argued for Unrestricted Composition; thus, a commitment to some things 
entails a commitment to a mereological collection of th se things. The deflationist aims 




reason, the deflationist claims, is because the ontol gists are equivocating on the 
definition of 'table'. 
 van Inwagen will grant the existence of simples arranged tablewise; thus, I take 
van Inwagen to be committed to a mereological colletion of simples arranged tablewise. 
Further, this is not an ontologically innocent commitment. Therefore, if 'table' is defined 
as a collection of simples arrange tablewise, then van Inwagen is committed to the 
existence of tables. Consequently, if van Inwagen denies the existence of 'tables', he must 
have a different definition of 'table' than Lewis. Either the debate is not substantive or the 
ontologists are equivocating on the definition of 'table'. Thus, the deflationist argument 





CHAPTER THREE: QUANTIFIER VARIANCE AND  
META-META-ONTOLOGICAL DEBATES 
 
III.I – Introductory Remarks 
 Thus far, I have addressed Sider's response to the deflationist that claims there is 
an equivocation on the meaning of 'table'. I have argued that Sider was not able to block 
the deflationist argument for a number of reasons. So, it seems that I have at least allowed 
for the deflationist position to be maintained. That being the case, it is an interesting 
question as to whether or not the deflationist program applies not only to ontological 
debates, but also to meta-ontological debates. 
 An analysis of this question will be at the meta-meta-ontological level. It is this 
analysis which I would like to pursue in this chapter. The meta-meta-ontological analysis 
will focus on the meta-ontological debate between Sider and Hirsch. I will look at an 
article by Gerald Marsh (2010) in which he claims that Eli Hirsch's deflationist program 
either favors Marsh's meta-meta-ontological position, or it is self undermining. 
 Before pursuing the meta-meta-ontological analysis, I need to finish my 
discussion of Sider's debate with the deflationist. I have yet to discuss Sider's views on 
quantifier variance which is the deflationist program defended by Hirsch.17 Thus, the 
strategy for this chapter is to first narrow the discussion by getting clear on Sider's view 
                                                 




of the deflationist program. This will motivate the discussion of quantifier variance in 
which I will look at Sider's presentation of quantifier variance and his response to it. 
 Once Sider's response is presented I will look at Hirsch's defense of the view. In 
this way, I will complete my investigation into Sider's response to the deflationist and 
provide context for my analysis of Marsh's discussion. I will investigate Marsh's article 
before offering my own critical analysis and presenting what I think to be a fundamental 
problem for debates of this nature, but first I must finish my discussion of Sider. 
III.II – Sider's Target Deflationist 
 Sider's taxonomy for the ontological deflationist positions includes the following 
four positions: equivocation, indeterminacy, obviousness, and skepticism (2009, 386). I 
will not address the adequacy of this taxonomy, but I should mention that although these 
labels are conventional, Sider's motivations are consistent with others.18 The deflationist 
position maintains that something is wrong with, for example, the ontological debate 
about composite material objects. When the universalist asserts 'There exist tables' and 
the nihilist asserts 'There do not exist tables', each asserts a true proposition. Since the 
propositions are contradictory, the deflationist concludes that they are both true because 
of some underlying mistake in the argument. 
 My concern will not be with the claim that truth value of the propositions cannot 
be determined (indeterminacy), nor am I concerned with the view that upon conceptual 
reflection the truth values are obvious (obviousnes). Rather, I am concerned with the 
                                                 
18 Philosphers typically choose a label for what they take to be central to the debate. For example: Karen 
Bennett prefers dismissivism and writes, "Neither 'skepticism' nor 'deflationism' are appropriate as a generic 
label" (2009, 39); Cian Dorr uses conciliatory semantics (2005, 237); Matti Eklund uses ontological 
pluralism (2009, 130); John Hawthorne uses superficialism (2009, 215); and Matthew McGrath uses 




deflationist claim that the ontologists are equivocating on a key component of the 
propositions. Sider focuses on equivocation, but claims that his arguments carry over to 
the other forms (2009, 387). Further, Sider provides a nominalist formulation to satisfy 
nominalist considerations. The additional deflationist positions and nominalist 
formulations will not be my concern. I will remain neutral on these claims and focus on 
Sider's responses to the deflationist concerned with equivocation. 
 The main idea behind the deflationist argument from equivocation is that the 
ontologists are equivocating on crucial terms. In the first two chapters, I addressed the 
deflationist argument from equivocation that claims the term that is equivocated on is the 
predicate 'is a table'. This is not the only term that the ontologists can equivocate on. To 
give a full account of the deflationist argument from equivocation, I must also address the 
possibility that the ontologists are equivocating o the existential quantifier 'there exist'. 
 Thus, the deflationist I have in mind for this chapter is claiming that the 
ontologists agree on the meaning of 'table' and the conditions required to be a 'table', but 
they disagree on the meaning of 'there exist'. The equivocation is claimed to be on the 
quantifier. This position has come to be known as quantifier variance.19 Quantifier 
variance is the other half of the deflationist argument from equivocation; therefore, to 
have a full understanding of this deflationist argument will require an investigation into 
equivocation of quantifiers. 
 With such basic propositions in question, I feel confident that an investigation 
into predicate and quantifier equivocation will be sufficient to exhaust the possibilities of 
equivocation. However, I will not argue for this here and will simply grant Sider the 
                                                 




claim that, "they [ontologists] must mean something different by the predicate 'table' or 
by the quantifier 'there exist' (or by both)" (Sider 2009, 387). 
 This inclusive disjunction has been the focus of my work. Sider's strategy (2009) 
is to respond to the deflationist position by denying both disjuncts. Sider moves quickly 
in his response to the first disjunct, predicate equivocation, and focuses most of his time 
on the second disjunct, quantifier variance. At this point, Sider cannot be successful, 
because the disjunct is false just in case both disjuncts are false. I have shown that 
equivocation on the predicate is not false; thus, the disjunction will be true regardless of 
the outcome for quantifier variance. Nevertheless, I cannot offer a holistic analysis of the 
argument from equivocation without discussing both disjuncts. To pursue my meta-level 
discussion, I will need to have thoroughly addressed both predicate equivocation and 
quantifier variance.  
 As a final remark on this disjunction, I want to address what Sider considers to be 
sufficient motivation for focusing his efforts on quantifier variance. Sider writes the 
following: 
Here is a further reason not to blame 'table' for the alleged equivocation: PVI and 
DKL also disagree over sentences not containing 'table'. Consider a world in 
which there exist exactly two material simples. Of that world, DKL would accept, 
while PVI would reject: 
∃∃∃"( ≠ 	&	 ≠ "	&	 ≠ ") (2009, 390) 
Sider concludes that in this sentence, equivocation can only occur on the quantifiers. The 
implications of this claim will figure prominently in my response to Sider, but I include 
the argument here as a final motivation for Sider's following conclusion: 
The deflationist must claim that the participants i ontological debates mean 
different things by the quantifiers. And so, the deflationist must accept that 
quantifiers can mean different things, that there are multiple candidate meanings 




Ultimately, Sider will reject quantifier variance, but his argument is complex and will 
require a thorough investigation.  
III.III – Quantifier Variance 
 Sider begins his discussion of quantifier variance by narrowing the meaning of 
quantifier variance to avoid some of the trivialities that a reader might presuppose.  To 
that end, Sider points out that, since language is conventional, 'there exist' could have 
come to mean any number of things. This, however, is not what the proponent of 
quantifier variance has in mind. In his defense of quantifier variance, Eli Hirsch writes, 
"Nothing is being said here to imply the idealist view that what exists in the world 
depends on our linguistic or conceptual decisions" (2002, 53). 
 There is another triviality that Sider wants to avid, namely, the idea that 
quantifier variance is simply a label for domain rest iction. I find myself considering this 
as an option at times as well. A proponent of domain restriction would argue that each 
ontologists makes a true assertion given the choice of domain for their claim. That is, the 
universalist would be correct because the choice of domain includes tables. The nihilist 
would also be correct, because they would limit their domain of quantification so that it 
does not include tables. 
 Sider, however, wants to argue that it would be a mistake to, "think of the variety 
of candidate meanings as resulting from different choi es of a domain for the quantifiers 
to range over," and that "the quantifier variantist's candidate meanings must be in some 
sense unrestricted" (Sider 2009, 393). I am highlighting this point because I find domain 





no speaker of any language can say truly that there exists a domain corresponding 
to a 'larger' quantifier meaning, for the simple reason that in any language, the 
sentence 'D is a domain containing everything; and some domain contains an 
object that is not contained in D' is a logical falsehood. (Sider 2009, 393) 
 Here Sider is expressing the faulty reasoning behind the nihilist's domain 
restriction. That is, the claim that the nihilist's proposition 'There do not exist tables' is 
true because tables are not included in the domain of quantification. This is to say that 
there is a larger domain that includes tables. Thus, domain restriction is not a candidate 
interpretation when Hirsch writes, "quantifier variance implies the expression 'there exists 
something' can be interpreted in a way that makes th  entence true or in a way that 
makes the sentence false" (2002, 51).20 
 The conclusion to be drawn is that an existentially quantified sentence can be true 
or false depending on the interpretation of the quantifier and this interpretation is not a 
matter of domain restriction. That there are multiple candidate meanings for quantifiers is 
a point that Sider is willing to grant, what remains s to determine "whether any of these 
interpretations is metaphysically distinguished, whether any of them uniquely matches 
the structure of the world, whether any carves nature at the joints better than the others" 
(Sider 2009, 392). For Sider, there is a single best metaphysically distinguished quantifier 
meaning and his defense is centered on his notion of structure and joint carving.21 
 Sider's discussion of structure begins with a motivation of the concept. He writes, 
"We ought to believe in an objective structure to reality" (2009, 397). For Sider this is 
because, among other reasons, structure is central to metaphysics and the sciences (2009, 
                                                 
20 Like Sider, my goal is to focus the discussion by acknowledging and setting aside the problem of what 
counts as a domain. I want to focus on Sider's fundamentality rather than problems with generality. How 
and if quantification can be unrestricted is a fascinating problem in its own right, and I recommend to the 
interested reader Absolute Generality (2006). Especially Fine's "Relatively Unrestricted Quantification" 
(2006) 
 




401). Sider provides this motivation to convince threader of the need for structure, or an 
analogous fundamental notion, in metaphysics. Once granted, Sider continues with the 
application of this concept to the problem at hand.  
 Since structure is getting at fundamentality, Sider offers ways of talking about 
concepts, namely predicates, that are more fundament l than others. In particular, Sider 
focuses on Lewis's method of talking about structure. Although he mentions alternative 
ways of making sense of structure, Sider will ultimately apply the Lewisian 
understanding to the deflationist argument from equivocation. 
 On Sider's interpretation, Lewis's method for explicating structure, "presupposes 
the existence of properties and relations, and its fundamental locution is a predicate over 
these properties and relations: 'is natural'" (Sider 2009, 402).22 This is worth getting clear 
about since this naturalness predicate is the fundamental concept on which Sider basis 
his response to the quantifier variantist. 
 The naturalness predicate can be monadic, 'x s natural', or two-place, 'x is more 
natural than y' where x and y are predicates or relations. The two-place predicate ptures 
Lewis's claim that "it would be best to say that the distinction between natural properties 
and others admits of degree" (Lewis 1986, 61). Hence, the two-place naturalness 
predicate is important since it provides a way of comparing properties, relations, etc. to 
                                                 
22 Since the predicate is said to be "over" certain properties, I take the predicate to be a second-order 




one another. As an example, Lewis writes, "The colours, as we now know, are inferior in 
naturalness to such perfectly natural properties as m ss or charge" (1986, 61).23 
 With the notion of structure motivated and the natur lness predicate granted, 
Sider only has one more step to make before responding to the deflationist. Sider writes 
the following: 
We should extend the idea of structure beyond predicates, to expressions of other 
grammatical categories, including logical expression  like quantifiers... Just as 
with a predicate, once can ask of a logical expression whether it carves the world 
at the joints. (2009, 404). 
Here, once again, Sider goes through a battery of arguments to defend against the view 
that someone might deny structure for logical expressions, even if they grant structure for 
predicates. It is in these arguments that I have concerns, namely, against the 
naturalness/structure notions applied to quantifiers. But let me postpone my response 
until I offer the conclusion of Sider's response to the deflationist. 
 If we grant Sider the claim that the notion of struc ure applies to quantifiers, then 
we grant, using Sider's term, quantificational structure. What this amounts to is that there 
will be a meaning for the existential quantifier which is more natural than any other. That 
is, quantifiers will have candidate meanings, but there will be one that, more than any 
other, matches the objective structure of the world. 
  
 
                                                 
23 I am concerned that there is a tacit employment of the idea that fundamental irreducible notions are 
already a part of reality. I do not see this defended, and I worry about circularity. Consider the following: 
Sider writes, "The predicate for naturalness, for Lewis, is undefined; it is at the very foundation of his 
metaphysical system" (2009, 402); Lewis writes, "Many philosophers are sceptical about the distinction 
between natural and gruesome [unnatural] properties. They think it illegitimate, unless it can somehow be 
drawn in terms that do not presuppose it. It is impossible to do that, I think, because we pressupose it 




 Sider's argument proceeds by first supposing that the meaning of a quantifier is a 
second-order property.24 Thus, the meaning of the existential quantifier is the "property 
had by P iff something has P" (Sider 2009, 407). So 'P' has this meaning just in case the 
property P is instantiated. Given this state of affairs, Sider concludes that the following is 
the most natural meaning for the existential quantifier: 
being a property P such that something has P ("existence") (2009, 407; Sider's 
emphasis) 
Here I will designate this "most natural" meaning as the property Enat rather than using 
the word 'existence' in bold type. 
 Returning to the deflationist, the argument from equivocation states that the 
ontologists mean something different by the predicate 't ble' or the quantifier 'there exist' 
or both. Here I am discussing Sider's response to the deflationist that claims the 
equivocation is on the quantifier 'there exist'; thus, Sider is responding to the quantifier 
variantist.  
 The quantifier variantist is claiming that the universalist's quantifier has one 
meaning, EU, while the nihilist has another, EN. Sider's response is that, although it may 
not fit their use perfectly, the ontologists are both employing the same meaning of 'there 
exist', namely, Enat. That is, they are using the quantifier with the most natural meaning. 
Since Sider consider the quantifier the only source of quivocation, his final response to 
the deflationist is as follows: 
both PVI and DKL mean existence by 'there exists', and the dispute is not merely 
verbal; the thesis of Equivocation is false. (2009, 410). 
In the next section I will address some of my concer s regarding Sider's supporting 
argumentation for this conclusion.  
                                                 





III.IV – Quantifier Variance Maintained 
 Sider has recently written: 
The more I think about these matters, the more convinced I become that whether 
quantifier variance is true, or whether instead there is a single, most natural, 
quantifier meaning, is the crux of metaontology. (Sider 2009, 565) 
As I have discussed, Sider argues that there is in fact a most natural quantifier meaning. 
Accordingly, Sider refers to himself as an o tological realist. I will refer to the argument 
in support of this view, the naturalness argument. This argument seeks to deny the 
quantifier variantist conclusion that the ontologists each assert true propositions given 
what they mean by the quantifier 'there exists'. This naturalness argument has come under 
heavy criticism, especially from Eli Hirsch, whom Sider's arguments can be seen as 
directed toward.25  
 Hirsch (2008) has offered cogent argumentation against Sider's view that there is 
a single best, most natural, meaning of the existential quantifier. Before looking at 
Hirsch's criticisms, I need to briefly address an assumption that Sider makes in his 
response to the deflationist. Sider states the assumption and its importance as follows: 
These arguments against deflationism assume that the "force of reference 
magnetism" is strong enough to outweigh a failure of xistence to match the use 
of 'there exists'... If the magnetic force is weak, then a defender of the thesis of 
Equivocation might, I concede, justly claim that PVI and DKL mean different 
things by 'there exists'. (2009, 411) 
Sider, following Lewis, thinks of the natural properti s and relations as things which help 
determine semantic content. That is, semantic indeterminacy can be avoided by appeal to 
naturalness. 
 However, Sider, again following Lewis, argues that n turalness is not quite all 
there is to the story. Naturalness needs reference magnets in addition. Roughly, reference 
                                                 




magnetism is the idea that the more natural a property is, the more attractive force it will 
have for use. This allows that, even in cases with competing natural properties, one will 
be the most natural, namely, the one with the strongest attractive/magnetic force. To 
demonstrate, Sider uses the thought experiment of the ideal interpreter. The idea is that an 
ideal interpreter would construct a translation manual for an unknown language by 
looking at a number of key things. The first is how words are used. Sider writes, "Think 
of this as determining a set of sentences, Γ... such that the interpreter ought... to interpret 
my words so that the members of Γ come out true" (2009, 400). 
 This is analogous to a prominent feature of Hirsch's quantifier variance, his 
linguistic principle of charity which states, "if we are trying to decide between two 
interpretations of a language, there is a presumption in favor of the one that succeeds 
better in making people's assertions come out true"(Hirsch 2008b, 368). For both Sider 
and Hirsch, a language should be interpreted such that the sentences in those languages 
come out true. However, Sider points out that there could be a case where, looking only 
at use, an ideal interpreter would interpret an intuitively false sentence as true.  
 To eliminate this possibility, Sider requires that in addition to use, naturalness is 
taken into consideration. Regarding the ideal interpreter interpreting his language, Sider 
writes the following: 
Other things being equal, the ideal interpreter must as ign natural properties and 
relations to my predicates. Natural properties and relations are 'reference magnets'. 
(2009, 400) 
 The metaphor of magnetism is to help convey the idea that, other things being equal, the 
more natural a property is, the more appropriate it is as an assignment of a predicate. 
Recall that to be more natural is to most closely rsemble the fundamental structure of the 




idea that Enat is more natural, is a stronger reference magnet, than other candidate 
meanings for the ontologists use of 'there exists'. If it is not, then as in the quote above, 
Sider must allow the possibility that the ontologists are equivocating on the quantifier. 
 Sider argues that, if this is a problem, the debat c n be setup in an artificial 
language.26 In short, Sider claims that if the property Enat is not magnetic (natural) 
enough, then the debate can be recast in a new language where it is. This new language is 
what Sider calls, Ontologese. This new language is constructed such that the existential 
quantifier is defined as expressing the property Enat. Thus, in Ontologese, any debate that 
employs the existential quantifier will involve the existential quantifier that expresses the 
property Enat. Sider concludes that the ontologists would still disagree if the ontologists 
construct their argument in Ontologese; therefore, Sider concludes that the debate cannot 
be the result of equivocating on the quantifier. 
 Hirsch's response to Sider will focus on this ideal language, Ontologese, and its 
motivations, namely, naturalness and reference magnetism. What Sider does is use 
naturalness and reference magnetism to identify the existential quantifier that most 
accurately carves nature at the joints. Sider writes, " xistence is a logical joint in reality" 
(2004, 646). So Sider is looking for the quantifier that captures the quantificational 
structure of the world. This quantifier, Enat is thus said to have such magnetic force that 
'there exists' must refer to Enat. 
 Hirsch argues that what Sider has done is taken an ontological debate about 
whether or not tables exist, and recast it as a metontological debate, in the language 
Ontologese, about "reality's logical joints and quantificational structure" (Hirsch 2008a, 
521). Hirsch's criticism is that Sider has just constructed another verbal debate, but at 
                                                 




another meta-level. It is still a verbal debate, just formulated in Ontologese, which can be 
thought of as at the meta-meta-level. That is, Hirsch claims that Sider made no progress 
in moving to a higher level. What remains is an argument to show that the 
metaontological debate is verbal, but a summary of Hirsch's thesis will be helpful. Hirsch 
succinctly characterizes his criticism as follows: 
the neo-ontological [metaontological] disputes about which sentences are true in 
Ontologese, the language that is aligned to the world's quantificational structure, 
merely recapitulates the traditional ontologists' verbal disputes about what exists. 
(2008a, 521) 
 Briefly, Hirsch argues that Sider's strategy for int oducing Ontologese does not 
avoid the problems it is trying to solve. Sider's tanslation instructions involve the same 
notions of naturalness, fundamentality, and quantifica onal structure. The individual 
dissatisfied with these notions at the ontological level, will find no satisfying account at 
the metaontological level. 
 Hirsch offers a formalization of Sider's argumentation here. Regarding choosing 
what language to deem Ontologese, Hirsh argues that whatever language one is currently 
using will, according to Sider's criteria, be the id al language. That is, the language which 
most closely corresponds to the quantificational structure of the world. Hirsch writes, 
"Sider's explanations of quantification structure... imply that the following two sentence-
schema are correct in all languages" (2008a, 522). The first is as follows: 
(1) A necessary and sufficient condition for an ontological language L to be 
aligned to the world's quantificational structure is that any sentence in L of the 
form "There exists such-and-such" is true iff part of he world's quantificational 
structure consists in the fact that there exists such-and-such. (2008a, 522) 
 Here I take Hirsch to be claiming that an ontological language corresponds to the 




obtains. That is, any given language  L corresponds to the world's quantificational 
structure just in case—'P' is true in L iff  P—where 'P' is an existential claim made in L.
 The following is the second sentence-schema that Hirsch presents: 
(2) There exists such-and-such iff part of the world's quantificational structure 
consists in the fact that there exists such-and-such. (2008a, 522) 
Here Hirsch is highlighting the fact that Sider's requirement for the correct ontological 
language requires an understanding of the world's quantificational structure. Notice the 
relation between (2) and the disquotational biconditional in (1). 
 Regarding (2), one might ask: How does one know if the world's quantificational 
structure consists in a certain ontological fact? On this point, Sider concedes that his 
arguments, "make an assumption about the true theory of content determination: that this 
theory wieghts naturalness heavily enough to overcome any mismatch there may be 
between existence and the use of 'there exists' " (2009, 411).  
 So, once again, Sider appeals to naturalness to rank languages, but as Hirsch 
notes, (1) and (2) together reveal that, regardless of what language is chosen, it can fulfill 
the requirements to be the ideal language. Any langu ge can fulfill (1) and (2) so long as 
the speaker considers the language more natural than o ers. Thus, Hirsch concludes: 
(3) This ontological language (the one currently being used), but no other 
ontological language, is aligned to the world's quantificational structure. (2008a, 
522) 
The significance here is that in addition to any language being a candidate for being the 
ideal language, once chosen, all others are precludd from being candidates. So, Hirsch 
concludes: 
The answer to Sider's question, "Which ontological language is aligned to the 
world's quantificational structure?" depends on which language one is speaking. 




 Here I agree with Hirsch, and the criticisms seem unavoidable for Sider. 
However, it should be noted that this is only a problem for the person that will not grant 
the Sider's notion of reference magnetism. This is significant for Sider, however, because 
Sider appeals to the ideal language to escape the depen ence on reference magnetism. As 
Hirsch's argument shows, Sider is not successful in avoiding the dependence.  
 Thus, Sider's response to the deflationist will depend on one's take on reference 
magnetism and naturalness. The naturalness concerns are unavoidable, even if Sider tries 
to formulate the debate at a higher meta-level, say, in Ontologese. While this conclusion 
does not result in a rejection of Sider's response to the deflationist, it does mark the point 
of disagreement. What one decides regarding the Sidr/Lewis idea of indefinable 
fundamental naturalness will determine whether or not Sider's response to the deflationist 
is successful.  
III.V – Is Sider-Deflationist debate merely verbal? 
 Hirsch's criticisms of Sider followed Sider from the meta-ontological level to the 
meta-meta-ontological level. There is a question which I think follows naturally from this 
discussion: Is the meta-meta-ontological debate between Sider and Hirsch merely verbal? 
In a recent article, Gerald Marsh (2010) answers by aying that if Hirsch's criteria for 
verbal debates is used, then yes. In this section, I will evaluate Marsh's argumentation and 
highlight those areas that may be problematic. I will offer my critical remarks in the next 
section. 
 Central to Marsh's discussion is the notion of Hirsch's interpretive charity and 
Sider's naturalness considerations. However, Sider's goal is to show that the ontological 




is not substantive, but rather is merely verbal. What I am concerned with is whether or 
not Marsh is correct when he claims that Hirsch's reasons for claiming the debate is 
verbal, make his own debate with Sider verbal. 
 Central to Marsh's discussion is Hirsch's interpretive charity discussion. Hirsch 
writes, "central to what I take to be the correct view of linguistic interpretation is an 
appeal to 'use,' but it must be understood that the only way to understand that appeal is in 
terms of what has been called the 'principle of charity'" (2009, 240).  
 Regarding the principle of charity, Hirsch has three central considerations: 
Charity to Retraction: If the community retracts a set of sentences that were 
previously accepted, then considerations of charity must favor an interpretation 
which makes the sentences false. (2008b, 368) 
Charity to Understanding: members of the linguistic community generally 
understand what they are talking about to the extent at least that they do not make 
a priori (conceptual) mistakes about seemingly uncomplicated judgments. (2008b, 
370) 
Charity to Perception: any language contains sentences used to make percptual 
reports, and that these reports are generally accurte (to a fair degree of 
approximation). (2008b, 372) 
Collectively these considerations serve as Hirsch's criterion for judging, in addition to 
use, linguistic interpretation. I have already addressed Sider's interpretive program, 
namely, that in addition to use, an ideal interpreter must "assign natural properties and 
relations to my predicates" (Sider 2009, 400).  
 Returning to the ontological debate about composite material objects, Hirsch 
claims that the ontologists equivocate on the meaning of the quantifier, because we 
should interpret the debate so that each ontologist makes claims that are true. Since the 
only location for interpretive charity is the quantifier 'there exists', Hirsch concludes that 




disagrees, and thinks that naturalness considerations entail a single understanding of 
'there exists' . That understanding is the one that carves nature at the joints.  
 Consider two linguistic communities that speak plain English.27 In one 
community, everyone agrees with Sider. This will be th  S-community which speak S-
English. In the other  community, everyone agrees with Hirsch. This will be the H-
community which speak H-English. Now consider the S-community and the H-
community disagreeing about the truth or falsity of quantifier variance. That is, the truth 
or falsity of the position that there are multiple candidate meanings for quantifier 
expressions that are equally natural and inferentially adequate.28 
 Marsh (2010, 463) proceeds by introducing the debate as follows: 
(S1) Quantifier variance is false. 
(H1) Quantifier variance is true.  
where (S1) is in S-English and (H1) is in H-English 
In S-English, (S1) is true, but false in H-English. Similarly, (H1) is true in H-English, but 
false in S-English. As in the case of the ontological debate, this meta-ontological debate 
has the appearance of being genuine. By that, I mean that it looks like Hirsch and Sider 
disagree on whether or not quantifier variance is true or false. However, at the meta-
meta-ontological level with which I am working, the d bate is not substantive because 
each will assert a true proposition when stated in their own language, or at least that is 
what the deflationist would desire.  
 To proceed with the analysis, Marsh considers two ways in which, in the spirit of 
Hirsch's deflationism, (S1) and (H1) can be interprted such that they both come out true. 
                                                 
27 Here I am following Hirsch's style of presenting the debate, see for example (2009, 65 ff.). 
 




That is, how in H-English, one would interpret (S1) and (H1) so that both are true. The 
first interpretation is disquotational, and the second is conciliatory (2010, 463). The 
disquotational interpretations are as follows: 
(S1D) 'Quantifier Variance is false' is true in S-English iff Quantifier Variance is 
false. 
(H1D) 'Quantifier Variance is true' is true in H-English iff Quantifier Variance is 
true. 
where S1D is stated in H-English and H1D is stated in S-English. 
Marsh’s strategy here, is to use the disquotational interpretations to evaluate this meta-
ontological debate in the same way Hirsch evaluated th  ontologists in the debate with 
Sider.29 
The problem with the disquotational interpretation is that, S1D turns out to be 
false in H-English, because the left and right side of the biconditional would have 
different truth-values for Hirsch. So the disquotational interpretation will not achieve the 
goal of providing an interpretation of S1 and H1 such that each come out true. So, Marsh 
offers the second interpretation, namely, the conciliatory interpretation.  
The goal of the conciliatory interpretation, is to be such that both Hirsch and Sider 
would agree that both are true. The conciliatory interpretations are constructed so that 
Sider and Hirsch interpret the other using their preferred interpretive method (hence the 
conciliatory label). Thus, for Sider, naturalness concerns will be the interpretive 
requirement, and for Hirsch, charity. 
 Following Marsh, I will use the labels (S1C) and (H1C) for the conciliatory 
interpretations. The interpretations are as follows: 
                                                 





(S1C)  'Quantifier Variance is false' is true in S-English iff if there are natural 
properties, then it is not the case that there are multiple existence-like 
candidate Sider-interpretations for expressions like 'there exists' each of 
which is adequate for describing the world (Marsh 2010, 464).30 
(H1C)  'Quantifier Variance is true' is true in H-English iff there are multiple 
existence-like candidate Hirsch-interpretations for expressions like 'there 
exists' each of which is adequate for describing the world. (Marsh 2010, 
464). 
where (S1C) is in H-English and (H1C) is in S-English 
 The logical structure does the work here. In (S1C), the right side of the 
biconditional is a conditional where in H-English both the antecedent and consequent are 
false. Thus, the conditional comes out true. Further, t  left side of the biconditional is 
true in H-English. So, since both sides of the biconditional have the same truth-value 
(true), the biconditional (S1C) is true in H-English. In (H1C), both sides of the 
biconditional are false in S-English; thus, (H1C) comes out true in S-English. So the 
conciliatory interpretations are such that both (S1C) and (H1C) come out to be true in 
their respective languages. 
Since Hirsch's deflationist concerns are the reference point, Marsh's argument 
concludes with an analysis of Hirsch's charity considerations regarding the disquotational 
and conciliatory interpretations. To summarize, Marsh argues that charity to perception is 
not applicable to the current discussion, charity to understanding favors the conciliatory 
interpretations, and charity to retraction can favor either disquotational or conciliatory 
depending on evidence.  
                                                 
30 I should note that Marsh uses"logical kind" where I have used "natural properties." Marsh uses Hirsch's 
phrase logical kind, but since this is an interpretation of Sider's viewpoint, I chose natural properties. 
Moreover, Sider chose natural properties because Lewis, from whom Sider adopted the notion, wrote, "The 
name [natural property] is borrowed from the familiar term 'natural kind'; the contrast is meant to be with 
unnatural, gerrymandered, gruesome properties" (Lewis 1986, 60). Thus, the label 'natural property' has




 The retracting consideration is guiding the following claim by Hirsch: "A 
plausibly charitable interpretation must take account of the strong presumption that 
reasonable people are expected to improve the accuracy of their judgments in the face of 
additional evidence" (2005, 74). Thus, in evaluating Hirsch's considerations on the 
different interpretations, Marsh is faced with considering whether evidence will favor the 
disquotational or conciliatory translations.  
 In the absence of such evidence, Marsh settles on the following disjunction, 
"Either there is some evidence such that charity to retraction renders Hirsch's 
metaontological dispute with Sider genuine or there is not" (2010, 466). From this, Marsh 
concludes the following: 
either Hirsch’s charity principles favor my conciliatory interpretations, or they 
weigh against Hirsch’s claim that certain object-level ontological disputes are 
merely verbal.(2010, 464). 
The dilemma is significant, and Marsh believes thatit ultimately shows that, "Hirsch's 
metaontological dispute with Sider is, by his own lights, merely verbal" (2010, 468). On 
this point, I disagree with Marsh, and I think the abbreviated argumentation he provides, 
upon closer examination, will reveal some problems.  
 
III.VI – Meta-Meta-Metaphysics 
 The claim Marsh is making is that, either Hirsch's charity considerations support 
Marsh's conciliatory view or they undermine Hirsch' claim that certain ontological 
debates are merely verbal. That is a strong claim, nd one that Hirsch may find 
problematic. For one thing, it's not clear that Marsh's conciliatory view is stable. By 




response along these lines when he writes, "one might object that either 'Hirsch-
interpretation' or 'Sider-interpretation' is a more eligible candidate meaning based on 
naturalness concerns" (2010, 466). 
 Hirsch's disquotational sentence-schema comes from his response to Sider (Hirsch 
2008a, 522). By using the disquotational schema, Hirsch proves that Sider is unable to 
avoid reliance on reference magnetism. However, this conclusion does not by itself make 
Sider's response to the deflationist false. For that to be the case, reference magnetism 
must also be denied. So Sider's appeal to naturalness remains. Thus, it is a consideration 
that must be addressed by Marsh for his final disjunction to be accepted. 
 While I have my doubts about Sider's naturalness con traint, the concern here is 
whether or not those speaking S-English would favor the conciliatory view. In the case of 
Marsh's conciliatory view, Sider would argue that one interpretation is more natural than 
the other. In Sider's language, one interpretation carves nature at the joints. By bringing 
in Sider's naturalness considerations, we once again have a case where we are deciding 
between competing interpretations. Thus, Marsh has made no progress. My claim is that 
Marsh has recapitulated the meta-level debate. This claim is the same as Hirsch's claim 
that Sider was merely recapitulating the traditional ontologists debate (Hirsch 2008a, 
521). 
 I believe that Hirsch is right to say that there is a frame of reference for these 
discussions. Commenting on Sider's attempt to choose an ideal language, Hirsch (inspired 
by Kripke) writes, "it seems that in asking this he is trying to stand 'both inside and 
outside language' at the same time" (Hirsch 2008a, 521). Accordingly, I take Marsh's 




considerations, but does not meet Sider's naturalness considerations. Regarding his 
conciliatory interpretations, Marsh writes, "It is unclear whether considerations of 
naturalness favour one interpretation over the other" (2010, 466). This would not be 
unclear for Sider. 
 Marsh's argumentative strategy applies to his own conclusion as much as to 
Hirsch or Sider. Thus, while Marsh's work is a helpful contribution at the interface of the 
metaontological views of Hirsch and Sider, it suffers the same fate of being trapped by 
this frame of reference problem. I am not immune to this frame of reference problem 
either. There is a conclusion, however, that I think can be drawn. I take the meta-meta-
ontological discussion to be more than verbal, but I conclude this on pragmatic rather 
than conceptual grounds. In doing so, I am following what I take to be a significant 
contribution to the discussion by Sider.31 
 Sider believes that the deflationist thesis of quantifier variance is wrong. Yet, he 
recognizes how fragile his position is. In an effort t  introduce Ontologese he found 
himself qualifying it to such a degree that the project seemed futile. The perfect language 
project, if successful, would be tremendously helpful to get all of us (Hirsch, Sider, 
Marsh, myself, and other metaontologists) out of this frame of reference problem. At this 
time, I have no argumentation that will solve the case, but at the end of his article, Sider 
(2009) remains skeptical.32 In short, he states that his Ontologese project will not 
convince those predisposed to be deflationist while at the same time recognizing that the 
                                                 
31 See his helpful discussion of a holistic approach to metaontology (Sider 2009, 416-420). 
 
32 Sider writes, "There are, then, various alternatives to ontological realism... And my argument for 




deflationist project will not convince those predispo ed to be serious ontologists (Sider 
2009, 416).  
III.VII – Conclusion 
 My aim in this chapter has been to locate Sider's ta get deflationist within the 
broader deflationist agenda. Sider's target deflationist has in mind an equivocation on one 
of the central terms in the ontological debate about c mposite material objects. In the first 
two chapters, I addressed my concerns about Sider's claim that the equivocation cannot 
be equivocation on a predicate. In this chapter, I focused on the deflationist claim that the 
equivocation is on the quantifier 'there exists'. 
 In doing so, I presented Sider's understanding of quantifier variance and his 
response based on naturalness and reference magnetism. I conclude that one's views on 
naturalness will determine the success of Sider's rsponse. I remain skeptical about 
Sider's appeal to naturalness. In addition to Sider's presentation of quantifier variance, I 
looked at Hirsch's argumentation in support of deflationism. 
 Hirsch focuses on a disquotational schema where, using Sider's criterion for an 
ideal language, any language can fulfill Sider's naturalness criterion so long as the 
speaker feels it is the most natural. I evaluate and support Hirsch's response to Sider, and 
conclude that in the absence further argumentation, Sider's naturalness argument is 
unsuccessful. Hirsch's disquotational schema highlights his goal of trying to interpret 
debating ontologists so that each comes out saying something true. 
 This principle of charity requirement could be problematic for Hirsch's program. 
To that end, I look at an article by Marsh where he presents a seemingly unavoidable 




conciliatory interpretation or they work against Hirsch's defense of the deflationist view 
at the ontological level. The force of the dilemma is that Marsh's conciliatory view shows 
that the debate between Hirsch and Sider is verbal. Thus, according to Marsh, either 
Hirsch accepts that conclusion, or he must reject his claim that the ontological debate 
about composite material objects is merely verbal. 
 In response, I argue that Marsh fails to fully address Hirsch's deflationist strategy. 
As a result, I deny Marsh's dilemma. To be charitable, as Hirsch would, Marsh must take 
into consideration Sider's naturalness argument. By incorporating Sider's naturalness 
argument, Marsh's discussion ends up being verbal. I conclude that, these debates turn on 
the language chosen to present the debates in. This results in my claim that there is a 
frame of reference problem in these debates. Finally, although Sider's naturalness 
considerations may be a way of escaping the frame of r ference problem, it's not at all 
clear what Sider's naturalness considerations amount t . For that reason, until further 
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